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These findings contribute to the literature by showing that instead of the number of 
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managerial implications, the findings suggest that by systematically supporting equal 
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Tiivistelmä 
Suomi on sijoittunut viime vuosina lukuisten tasa-arvovertailujen kärkeen. Naisten 
osuus pörssiyhtiöiden hallituksissa on keskimäärin 29% kun taas johtoryhmissä se on 
24%. Naistoimitusjohtajien osuus (8.9%) on kuitenkin yllättävän alhainen. Tämä voi 
olla ongelmallista yrityksille, koska ne eivät välttämättä hyödynnä parhaita 
mahdollisia resursseja yrityksen johdossa. Samalla yksityisen sektorin kansainvälinen 
kilpailukyky saattaa kärsiä, mikä voi aiheuttaa myös yhteiskunnallisia 
haittavaikutuksia.  
Tämän tutkimuksen tavoitteena on selvittää, miten pörssiyhtiöiden hallitusten ja 
johtoryhmien sukupuolijakauma voi vaikuttaa naistoimitusjohtajien valinnan 
todennäköisyyteen. Tutkimus keskittyy vuosien 2015-2019 välillä julkistettuihin 
toimitusjohtajanimityksiin Helsingin pörssissä.  
Tutkimusaineistoksi kerättiin aineistoa 115 toimitusjohtajanimityksestä 73 
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Logistinen regressio osoittaa, että naistoimitusjohtajan valinnan ja naisten 
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naisten määrän systemaattista kasvattamista muissa ylimmän johdon tehtävissä sekä 
yritysten hallituksissa. Naisten määrän lisääminen vain hallituksessa ei yksin ole 
riittävä toimenpide.  
Tutkimus tukee kirjallisuutta osoittamalla, että hallituksen sukupuolijakauman lisäksi 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Background 
 
The world is experiencing a movement towards female empowerment in business, which 
has incited discussion amongst practitioners, politicians and scholars. Finland, along with 
other Nordic countries, is seen as a forerunner in gender equality. Yet, Halttula and 
Saikkonen (2020) state that Finnish women still face discrimination particularly at the top 
of corporate hierarchies. This has been captured by several investigations on gender in 
the top leadership of Finnish stock listed companies (Halttula & Saikkonen, 2020; 
Teräsaho & Kupiainen, 2015; Turunen & Linnainmaa, 2018). Indeed, the female 
representation on the board of directors has been on a steady rise over the past decade. 
Currently the average share of women on boards is 25% in small firms, and 34% in large 
firms (Horttanainen & Kajala, 2020). At the same time, on average 24% of executive 
team members are women. This places Finland within the top 10 OECD countries in 
terms of gender equality on boards and executive teams.  
 
However, the development of female CEOs shows a different trend. In 2011, Finnish 
stock listed firms had no female CEOs, and until 2015 only of these firms was led by a 
woman. Over the past five years, this number has increased to 11, which still constitutes 
only 8.9% of CEOs. This places Finland 13th in an EU wide ranking of the proportion of 
female CEOs in the largest stock listed firms (Horttanainen & Kajala, 2020).  
 
The term “top leadership” is used to describe the board of directors, or the corporate 
board, which is the entity responsible for appointing and overseeing the CEO. In addition, 
the top leadership includes the CEO and their executive team.  Looking at these entities, 
a clear discrepancy exists between the appointment of women directors and executives 
and female CEO successions. Although positive development in gender diversity has 
occurred in recent years, the numbers show that women are still a clear minority in the 
top leadership,   
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In response, a variety of non-legal measures have been implemented to improve equality 
in Finland. These include diversity reporting requirements in the corporate governance 
code, mentorship programs and active reporting of equality development (Turunen & 
Linnainmaa, 2018). In addition, politicians, organizations and practitioners have 
emphasized the active role that companies should take to foster equality and inclusion. 
Despite these measures the development has been unequal. This calls for further 
investigation on the mechanisms that enable women to reach the leadership positions on 
the very top of the hierarchy.     
 
Significant streams of literature have developed around the challenges and enablers that 
women face in reaching for top leadership positions. However, only a few have 
investigated the relationship between the gender composition of corporate boards and 
CEO succession. A key contribution in this stream is the gender spillover theory, which 
suggests that increasing the number of female directors increases the number of female 
CEO successions (Matsa & Miller, 2011). Building upon this idea, You (2019) found that 
a significant increase in the likelihood occurs when the corporate board has three or more 
female directors. This finding is in line with critical mass theory (Kanter, 1977). While 
these studies offer key insights into the relationship between female directors and CEO 
succession, the literature contains several gaps and shortcomings, which this study aims 
to address.  
 
Firstly, the literature tends to focus on the relationship between the board of directors and 
CEO succession in isolation, ignoring the role of executive teams. As stated by 
Horttanainen and Kajala (2019), future CEOs are found form today’s boards of directors 
and executive teams, which indicates that both entities have stakes in the succession 
process. Based on this insight, this thesis incorporates the joint effect of women on 
executive teams and boards of directors on female CEO succession.  Secondly, the body 
of previous literature on this relationship is small and most studies focus on the largest 
corporations in the United States. Although various gender equality investigations have 
been conducted in Finland, this relationship has not previously been examined in the 
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Finnish context. Thus, further research is needed to understand the issue in the cultural 
context of Finland. These considerations lead to the formulation of the research problem 
and hypotheses for the study. 
 
 
1.2. Purpose and scope of the study  
 
Previous studies on board gender composition and CEO succession have concentrated on 
the US market, with some geographical coverage in Norway, Sweden, and Italy. Although 
Finland performs amongst the top countries in terms of gender equality on boards of 
directors, it has not received much attention in the literature. Despite the relatively high 
share of women directors and executives, an alarming lack of females still exists in 
CEO positions in publicly traded firms. This divide between female appointments to top 
corporate positions and lack of female CEOs constitutes the key problem that this 
research aims to address. 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate how the likelihood of female CEO succession 
is affected by the gender composition of the board of directors and executive teams in 
companies listed on the Helsinki Stock Exchange. The terms appointment and succession 
are used interchangeably in this thesis to refer to the selection of a new CEO. As expressed 
by Horttanainen and Kajala (2020), there is no quick and easy fix to the issue of gender 
imbalance at the top of publicly traded firms. However, understanding the key drivers of 
issue can guide decisions and behavior towards the right direction.  
 
The study is conducted using secondary data collected from annual reports of Helsinki 
stock listed companies on CEO succession events between the years 2015-2019. Thus, 
the research is limited to publicly available data. Since the sample contained all CEO 
successions for which the relevant data were available, this can be considered a 
population study. Before proceeding to the literature review, the significance and 
contributions of this study are discussed in the next section.   
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1.3. Significance and contribution 
 
The findings of this thesis are significant from academic, managerial and societal 
standpoints. The significance of the research on each level is summarized in Table 1. 
First, while the relationship between gender diversity on boards and appointment of 
female CEOs has received some attention in the literature, the results have been mixed. 
Particularly, researchers have disagreed on weather and to what extent the number of 
women on boards makes a difference in appointment decisions. Furthermore, there seems 
to be a clear gap in the literature regarding the joint effect of female directors and 
executives on CEO appointment, which is incorporated in this study. Moreover, where 
much of the succession research is conducted in the US, this study aims to contribute to 
the understanding of succession in the context of Finland. In fact, to the best of my 
knowledge, this is the first study on this particular relationship in Finland.  Because 
Finland is considered a leading country in terms of equality, it creates a theoretically 
interesting context for research. The research gap is explained in detail in the literature 
review. In addition, the managerial significance of this developing a more thorough 
understanding of how managerial actions can contribute to enhancing gender diversity in 
top leadership. For a societal standpoint, the study offers significant contributions for 
understanding the mechanisms that contribute to the gender equality gap that still exists 
in top leadership of corporations. 
 
  
 5 
Table 1 Summary of the research significance and contribution 
Area Significance  Contribution 
 
Academic 
 
Broadening the theoretical 
understanding of how the gender 
composition of boards and executive 
teams can jointly affect CEO 
appointment. This study is the first 
on this topic in the Finnish context.  
 
 
The findings suggest that the 
combination of female 
executives and directors is a 
more powerful predictor for 
female CEO succession than 
the absolute number or critical 
mass of female directors. 
 
Managerial Understanding how managerial 
actions can contribute to increasing 
gender diversity in the top of the 
corporate hierarchy. 
 
Increasing the number of 
female CEOs requires 
systematic improvement in 
gender composition of both 
executive teams and boards. 
Only adding more female 
directors is not a sufficient 
enough measure.  
 
Societal Understanding the mechanisms that 
contribute to the gender equality gap 
are important, as Finland can only 
succeed in global competition when 
the private sector deploys the best 
possible resources. 
The findings suggest that with 
the current trend, the number 
of female CEOs cannot be 
expected to change before the 
overall number of women in 
the upper echelons has 
increased.  
 
 
 
The specific contributions of this study are also threefold. From an academic standpoint, 
this research makes significant contribution showing that the combined effect of women 
of executive teams and supervisory boards may have a significant effect on the odds of 
female CEO succession. The findings suggest that the number of female directors and 
executives is a strong indicator for the likelihood of female CEO succession. This finding 
provides a significant contribution to the literature in terms of showing that the 
combination of female executives and directors is a more powerful predictor for CEO 
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succession than the absolute number or critical mass of female directors. Most previous 
research has studied the effect of the board of directors in isolation.  
 
In terms of managerial contribution, there are two main takeaways for firms. Firstly, 
companies can address the inequality issue by increasing the number of women 
executives and directors, to increase the pool of candidates and decision-making power 
of women. Secondly, by acknowledging this trend, firms can make conscious aims to 
break the pattern and consider female CEO candidates even before the number of women 
on boards and executive teams increases. Chapter 6 elaborates on the practical 
implications for firms.  
Lastly, while not much research has focused on Finland, this study also makes a 
contribution to Finnish society. This research explains factors that contribute to the gap 
between a relatively high degree of female directors and low degree of female CEOs in 
Finland. This understanding can contribute to creating new mechanisms to bridge this 
gap. The findings suggest that with the current trend, the number of female CEOs cannot 
be expected to change before the overall number of women in the upper echelons has 
increased. 
 
 
1.4. Structure of the thesis 
 
The thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 contains the literature review, which explores 
the existing literature on the topic of gender spillovers and challenges for gender equality 
in top leadership. The literature presents relevant concepts and theories to frame the 
empirical part of the study. The literature review is followed by a presentation of the 
research design and methods. This section includes the philosophical and ethical 
considerations of this study. In addition, a description of the methodological approach 
and the procedural steps taken in data collection and analysis are explained in this chapter. 
Chapter 4 presents the findings from the statistical analysis, which are interpreted and 
discussed in Chapter 5. Finally, Chapter 6 includes a summary and implications of the 
study, and suggestions for further research.   
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate how the likelihood of female CEO succession 
is affected by the gender composition of the board of directors and executive teams in 
companies listed on the Helsinki Stock Exchange. The main bodies of literature on the 
topic relate to gender in organization, organizational behavior and corporate governance.  
 
The literature review serves two objectives. Firstly, it introduces the foundation and 
context of the research problem. More specifically, this section discusses the factors that 
influence the career development opportunities of women. Key theories and concepts on 
the macro, meso and micro level are highlighted, providing important insight into the 
causes of inequality in firms. At the macro-level, institutions and markets play central 
roles in the career development of women. The meso-level focuses on the organization 
and its culture, in which concepts such as discrimination, tokenism, elite networks and 
gender compensation gaps are emphasized. Finally, focus is shifted towards the micro-
level, which explores the individual in the organization. Here, the emphasis is on 
managerial aspirations, work-family conflict, and submissive group behavior, which may 
hinder career development on the individual level. This theoretical foundation is critical 
for drawing insights on the factors that influence female CEO succession. 
 
The objective of the second half is to explore existing research related directly to board 
gender composition CEO succession, to identify the gaps and inconsistencies in the 
literature. This part focuses mainly on corporate governance literature. The insights 
drawn from this stream of literature are used to create the theoretical framework for the 
study. The main contributions in this stream are summarized (Table 3) towards the end 
of this chapter. The two main theories upon which this study builds are the gender 
spillover theory (Matsa & Miller, 2011) and critical mass in female CEO appointment 
(Kanter, 1977; You, 2019). These theories indicate that increasing the number of female 
directors in general increases the odds of female CEO succession (Matsa & Miller, 2011), 
 8 
and a particular increase is seen when the number of female directors reaches the critical 
mass of three (You, 2019).  In addition, other key concepts relating to women on boards 
and CEO succession are introduced. Based the need for additional research in this area, 
three hypotheses are presented at the end of this chapter for further empirical testing.  
 
 
2.2. Factors that influence the career development of women 
 
As stated by Halttula and Saikkonen (2020), women still face significant obstacles in their 
path towards the top positions in the corporate hierarchy. The literature shows that these 
obstacles originate from institutional and governmental influences all the way to 
individual behaviors, challenges and decisions. Therefore, the theoretical contributions 
are discussed in three sub-sections: macro, meso and micro influences. As presented by 
Jeurissen (1997), the macro-level incorporates institutions, governments, national culture 
and markets. A brief assessment of theories in this stream is presented first. The meso-
level focuses on the organization, it’s culture and structure (Jeurissen, 1997), which is the 
focus of the second part. Third, the focus is directed to the micro-level, which discusses 
the individuals within the organization. Each of these levels aim to explain the 
phenomenon from a different perspective but it is important to note that they are all 
intertwined.   Collectively, these theories explain the conditions in which firms tend to 
reject female candidates in high ranking positions.  
 
 
2.2.1. Macro-level influences  
 
Although the empirical part of this study focuses mostly on the organizational and 
individual levels, it is important to understand how female career mobility is influenced 
by macro forces. Firstly, some countries have aimed to address gender inequalities by 
imposing legal gender quotas.  Hence, a brief review of literature in this stream is 
presented first. Secondly, a significant pool of literature is developed on institutional 
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theories on females in leadership, which are discussed next. These theories explain some 
of the institutional context of this study.    
 
2.2.1.1. Gender quotas  
 
Gender diversity in top leadership has wide societal implications which national 
governments have aimed to address by different mechanisms (Torchia, Calabrò, & Huse, 
2011; Iannotta, Gatti, & Huse, 2015; Terjesen, Aguilera, & Lorenz, 2014). Some 
countries, such as Norway and Italy have chosen to impose quota legislation to address 
this issue (Huse, 2011). However, research has produced mixed results on the 
effectiveness of board quotas. On one hand, Torchia, Calabró and Huse (2011) argue that 
Norway has benefitted from gender quota legislation, as the number of directors has 
increased drastically in a short period to constitute nearly half of the board. On the other 
hand, Iannotta et al. (2015, p. 1) found that quotas on their own are insufficient for 
increasing female representation on board since they can increase the risk of “institutional 
isomorphism or social legitimacy”. This indicates that quotas can impose negative 
constraints for companies, which may force them into a similar shape that is not 
necessarily optimal. The challenges of quotas are recognized by Turunen and Linnainmaa 
(2018) who argue against imposing quotas in finland. The authors emphasize that Finland 
can effectively overcome gender inequality in top leadership by non-legal means. This 
prompts an assesment of the other institutional influences that factor into the career 
development of women. 
 
 
2.2.1.2. Institutional influences  
 
While the effectiveness of quotas has been disputed, other countries like Finland have 
chosen to pursue a non-legal route for increasing female leadership.Thus in the literature, 
female inclusion in top executive and director positions is observed from a wide 
institutional lens, incorporating legal, cultural influences (Grosvold & Brammer, 2011) 
as well as political, economic and social structures of countries across the world (Terjesen 
& Singh, 2008). Some of the factors include equal pay (Torchia et al., 2011), family 
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norms, education and economic institutions (Grosvold & Brammer, 2011). Furthermore, 
the proportion of women completing tertiary education, and well-established social 
security systems were found to be positively correlated with increasing female executives 
and directors (Tyrowicz et al., 2020). Looking at the institutional environment of Finland, 
these findings would indicate that a high degree of gender equality would be found from 
the upper echelons of companies. While board gender equality in Finland has risen over 
the years and ranks among the top countries in Europe, improvement is still needed 
particularly on the executive level (Turunen & Linnainmaa, 2018). 
 
Recent research on female representation on executive boards and supervisory boards in 
Europe has, however, presented interesting new insights into institutional enablers of 
gender equality in upper echelons (Tyrowicz et al., 2020). First, general full-time female 
participation in the labor market may not be correlated with gender equality on 
management or supervisory boards as previously argued (Tyrowicz et al., 2020). 
Furthermore, from an institutionalized cultural standpoint, the authors found that 
countries that value self-expression and happiness over economic prosperity should see 
fewer female directors. Terjesen and Singh (2008) also found that countries, like Finland, 
with longer histories of women involved in politics are less likely to exhibit high numbers 
of female directors on corporate boards.  These finding may provide explanations to the 
trends seen in Finland, where the overall level of full-time employment for women has 
not necessarily translated to equality at the top of organizations (Turunen & Linnainmaa, 
2018). Clearly, there are mixed findings on the macro-level influencers of gender equality 
on the top of organizational hierarchies. Thus, explanations may be found from the 
organizational level, looking at the spillover effects between corporate boards, executive 
teams and CEOs. Before further exploring this idea, understanding why firms benefit 
from increasing female representation is important from a market perspective. Therefore, 
a brief review of the literature on females and firm performance is presented next. 
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2.2.2. Meso-level influences 
 
The literature shows that the career advancement of females is not exclusively impacted 
by macro-environmental factors. In fact, there are various theories aimed to explain the 
meso-level influences that enable and disable upward career mobility for women 
(Gabaldon et al., 2015). These organizational barriers have created the “glass ceiling” 
which prevents women from advancing upward in organizations like their male peers 
(Matsa & Miller, 2011). Behind the glass ceiling are various theories of social psychology 
and organizational behavior. The theories of focus in this section are chosen based on 
reoccurring themes in the literature. First, attention is drawn to discrimination, which 
Gabaldon et al (2015) list as one of the most predominant theories at the organizational 
level. Second, the literature on tokenism (Kanter, 1977) is explored to understand why 
solo women cannot properly influence organizational decision making. Third, the old 
boys’ and golden skirts’ networks (Huse, 2011) literature is examined. This theory 
highlights the possibility that elite networks established by both men and women may 
decrease demand for candidates outside of the network.  Lastly, the role of the gender 
compensation gap is discussed. 
 
However, before proceeding to the challenges that women face in the organization, an 
overview of literature on how women in top leadership influence firm performance is in 
place. This creates the foundation on why increasing the number of women in leadership 
is beneficial at the firm level in the first place.  
 
 
2.2.1.2. Women influencing firm performance 
 
Scholars have found female CEOs to have a positive impact on firm performance (Cook 
& Glass, 2015). Specifically, companies led by a female CEO with more women on the 
board were found to perform better (Cook & Glass, 2015). This indicates that the number 
of female directors matters for women to gain support and build coalitions, which will be 
further discussed later in this chapter. Furthermore, female CEOs tend to be more risk 
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averse and systematic in terms of risk-taking than male CEOs, which studies have shown 
lead to stronger long-term performance (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2019; Khan & Vieito, 2013). 
Overall, the literature shows that appointing a woman as CEO has organizational and 
financial benefits in addition to promoting social equity. Thus, from a theoretical 
standpoint, it is in the best interest of firms to equally consider female candidates for top 
executive positions.   
 
In addition, researchers have investigated the relationship between women on the board 
of directors and firm performance. The board of directors consists of experienced 
individuals who are chosen to advise and control the executive actions of a corporation 
(O'Neal & Thomas, 1995). The connection between boards and firm performance is 
complex due to the variety of macro and micro environmental forces that may factor into 
the relationship. Thus, it can be assumed that research on this topic has produced largely 
mixed results.  
 
However, there is an abundance of evidence that gender diverse boards can produce 
positive organizational change. For instance, increasing the number of female directors 
was found to have a positive impact on firm strategy by increasing the volume and 
complexity of competitive actions (Kolev et al., 2019). This relationship was intensified 
by the effect of having a female CEO, demonstrating that including women in different 
levels of decision making can further improve competitiveness (Kolev et al., 2019). 
Furthermore, critical mass theory, which is explained in detail later in this chapter, has 
also been linked to other aspects of business. By applying critical mass theory, researchers 
have found that increasing the number of female directors has had positive effects on 
innovation (Torchia et al., 2011) and financial performance (Lafuente & Vaillant, 2019).  
Indeed, women directors are found to contribute positively to many aspects of 
performance, demonstrating the need to increase their representation on boards.  
 
Accoring to Jeurissen (1997), firms adapt to market signals, and tend to relocate resources 
and workforce accordingly. Thus, acknowledging the positive impact that women can 
have on firm performance should lead to more women in leadership. However, although 
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literature offers evidence on the benefits of having female leaders, this has not necessarily 
been the case. There are still several barriers in place at the organizational level that hinder 
female advancement to top positions. The influences have received attention from 
scholars in the fields of social psychology, organizational studies and management. The 
following section offers an in-depth look at one of the key obstacles that women have 
faced in the workplace for decades, which is discrimination.   
 
 
 
 
2.2.2.1. Discrimination in the workplace 
 
As presented by Gabaldon et al. (2015), discrimination is one of the critical theories 
explaining why some organizations have developed cultures that feed to unequal 
treatment. Gabaldon et al. (2015) summarize the key research on discrimination faced by 
women in leadership (Table 2), upon which this literature review builds by including an 
overview of more recent theories. Although researchers have approached this issue in a 
variety of different ways, most have arrived at the same conclusion: competence does not 
guarantee career advancement for women in the same way it does for men (Heilman, 
2001; Wolfers, 2006; Phelps, 1972). 
 
One of the foundational theories in this space is considered to be statistical discrimination 
(Phelps, 1972). Phepls (1972) explains how perceptions of women being inferior in 
qualification, reliability and leadership skills may cause discriminatory behavior towards 
them. A critical remark here, however, is that these views are caused by stereotypes and 
lack fact-based reasoning (Phelps, 1972). The effect is further strengthened by 
information asymmetry. Consequently, while other relevant information about individual 
qualifications, skills and performance is lacking, the tendency to rely on preconceptions 
increases (Phelps, 1972). In gauging the biases and expectations held by the general 
public, stock markets are considered a good indicator reflecting how investors perceive 
the value and future prospects of firms (Wolfers, 2006). Hence, Wolfers (2006) argues 
that mistake-based discrimination, referring to regular underestimation of the skills of 
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women, could be identified from the undervaluation of firms led by women CEOs. 
However, Wolfer (2006), as many other researchers face the challenge of producing 
statistically significant results due to the overall lack of female CEOs in the sampled 
firms.  
 
On the other hand, a paradox between the expected behavior of women and business 
leaders clearly exists (Heilman, 2002). Heilman (2002) bases the taste-based 
discrimination theory on two types of stereotyping: descriptive expectations about what 
female leaders are like and the prescriptive expectations on how they should behave. 
Heilman (2002) further explains the preconceived differences between sexes in relation 
to business and leadership, which are generally described by masculine characteristics. 
Men are stereotypically considered more aggressive, goal-oriented and rational, which 
are characteristics associated with success in business. Fritz and Knippenberg (2017) also 
categorize these traits as agentic orientation. Furthermore, agentic orientation, is 
associated with ambition, competitiveness and dominance (Fritz & van Knippenberg, 
2017). Because women in general are perceived more nurturing and service-oriented, and 
inferior in “masculine” traits, they may be labeled unfit for leadership positions due to 
this description-based bias (Heilman, 2001). The sensitive and relationship-oriented traits 
associated with women are categorized as communal orientation (Fritz & van 
Knippenberg, 2017). The institutionalized expectation that leadership traits are masculine 
steer firms to select male candidates. Consequently, the demand for female candidates 
decreases. 
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Table 2 Summary of discrimination theories 
Type of discrimination Author (year) Description 
Statistical Discrimination Phelps (1972) The perception of 
performance related to 
gender stereotypes. 
 
Mistake-based 
Discrimination 
Wolfers (2006) 
 
Regular underestimation of 
female skills. 
 
Taste-based 
Discrimination 
Heilman (2002) The association of 
leadership and masculinity 
which directs preference 
towards male leaders. 
 
Implicit Discrimination Bertrand, Chugh, & 
Mullainathan (2005) 
 
Unconscious preference 
towards certain types of 
leaders. 
 
Gendered Market Effect Longin & Santacreu-
Vasut, (2019) 
Discrimination against the 
opposite sex due to support 
for own. 
 
 
A more recent explanation for market reactions to female-led companies is the argument 
that markets are gendered (Longin & Santacreu-Vasut, 2019). The gendered market 
theory alludes that women are inclined to react positively to female CEO appointments 
while men, in general, tend to react negatively (Longin & Santacreu-Vasut, 2019). In the 
case that a male CEO is appointed, responses are respectively reversed. This indicates 
that rather than purposefully rejecting the opposite sex, representatives of both genders 
tend to support demographically similar candidates (Longin & Santacreu-Vasut, 2019). 
This idea is further developed in CEO succession literature, which is discussed later in 
this chapter. While the premises for the gendered market theory are not necessarily based 
on intentional discrimination, the outcomes may be similar, leading to the strengthening 
of an existing male majority. 
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Indeed, the literature shows that discrimination may not stem from conscious agendas. In 
fact, drawing upon studies on gender in the CEO succession process, the gendered market 
effect may also be a product of unconscious discriminatory behavior caused by the natural 
inclination to support candidates with similar backgrounds (Cornell & Welch, 1996). 
Related to this, Bertrand, Chugh and Mullainathan (2005) introduce the concept of 
implicit discrimination. Implicit discrimination refers to unconscious associations that 
translate to negative attitudes towards, for instance, minorities. This can be considered a 
significant contribution to the discrimination literature, as implicit discrimination may be 
more difficult to recognize, and thereby more challenging to change. However, when 
implicit discriminatory behavior is recognized, the authors suggest that it may be 
remedied by including minority members in the hiring process, both in the phase of 
screening candidates and in the context of interviewing candidates (Bertrand et al., 2005). 
Whilst the level of intent underlying the behavior may vary, markets in general react 
negatively to announcements of female CEO appointments due to the lower number of 
active female investors (Longin & Santacreu-Vasut, 2019). In addition, if CEO 
succession is assumed to follow the gendered market theory, increasing the number of 
female CEOs can be assumed to require increasing the number of female directors taking 
part in the appointment decision.  
 
Yet, in some cases, minority group members may also reject others from the same group. 
The literature offers evidence on the argument that women strategically reject successful 
women as a form of self-protection against social comparisons to themselves (Parks-
Stamm et al., 2007). Parks-Stamm et al. (2007) found that while participants of both 
genders penalized successful women, the behavior of female participants was connected 
to their self-evaluation of their personal competence. Moreover, receiving positive 
feedback reduced the penalties that female participants gave to successful women.  This 
indicates that instead of empowering each other, powerful women may strategically aim 
to reject other powerful women in fear of facing negative comparisons. This phenomenon 
has also been referred to as the queen bee syndrome (Staines et al., 1973). Similar findings 
were made by Bonet, Cappelli and Hamori (2019), who argue that the appointment of 
female executives slows down once there are a few women in the upper echelons of 
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corporations. Contradictory to the idea that females support females on the corporate top, 
this may indicate that women may have a tendency to reject other women from attaining 
similar positions.  Overall, discriminatory behavior may be driven by a variety of causes. 
Nevertheless, discriminatory behavior engrained in an organizational culture limits the 
career advancement opportunities for women. This may lead to a culture of tokenism, 
where solo women are only included on boards and executive teams for image reasons. 
The following section explores this phenomenon in more detail.  
 
 
2.2.2.2. Tokenism in top leadership 
 
With the numerical representation of women on boards still remaining generally low in 
organizations, “tokenism” has become a common issue in boards with one or two female 
directors (Kanter, 1977). Kanter (1977) found that when there are fewer women on higher 
levels of the organization, gender becomes a differentiating characteristic that attracts 
attention and creates expectations which shape their behavior. As explained by Kanter 
(1977), solo women on male dominated boards are prone to be seen as representatives of 
their gender rather than equal peers, which may be manifested in discrimination or hyper-
scrutiny of these women. Consequently, the turnover and rate of failure of women in such 
positions appeared much higher than that of men (Kanter, 1977). While the main 
argument of increasing diversity on teams is to include a wider set of perspectives and 
different ideas, token females are often not brought in for their talent, experience or views 
but rather to increase legitimacy in the eyes of key stakeholders (You, 2019). Although 
the number of female directors has been on a steady rise particularly in the Nordic 
countries, “tokenism” is still often present with a representation of only one or two 
minority board members. This makes it challenging or impossible to create powerful 
coalitions (You, 2019) in voting for central causes such as strategic directions or 
executive appointments.  
 
The literature also explains how the treatment of token females contributes to their higher 
turnover rate and the challenges of proving their competence as the minority member. 
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From interviewing 50 female directors in Fortune 100 companies, Konrad et al. (2008) 
discovered that on boards with only one female, the risk of the woman director being 
ignored, stereotyped, put on the spot or excluded is high. The authors found that despite 
minor improvement, tokenism still exists with two women on the board, where they often 
face blame for conspiring if they work closely together. Moreover, behavioral studies on 
male dominated boards suggest that the competitive environment of the Fortune 1000 
companies, also seen as the most powerful positions in business, pin men to compete with 
each other (Konrad et al., 2008). Interestingly, Konrad et al. (2008) found that female 
directors seemed to be left out of this competition, causing them to feel ignored and 
treated like female representatives rather than equals. In a group setting, men tend to 
express opinions more frequently whereas women tend to talk only when they feel like 
they have something valuable to contribute (Konrad et al., 2008). Similar findings were 
made by Ely and Thomas (2001), who argue that these types of negative behaviors 
towards minority subgroups decrease the effectiveness of diversity in a work group. On 
the other hand, diversity can influence how the group functions when women were 
integrated, legitimized and treated with fairness (Ely & Thomas, 2001). This shows that 
companies that treat women as tokens do not reap the benefits of having diverse executive 
teams and boards, which they could potentially achieve by fair treatment.  
 
 
2.2.2.3. Old boys’ and golden skirts’ networks 
 
On the meso-level, many have theorized that the scarcity of female CEOs is a result of 
false preconceptions of female competence and reinforced negative stereotypes. 
However, another stream of literature has developed around the effect of elite networks 
on top leadership appointment. The more traditional of these has been coined the old 
boys’ network (Adamson, 2016; Konrad et al., 2008). The old boys’ network refers to an 
informal social system in which men in the highest executive positions form alliances, 
where power is transferred among an elite group and maintained within an “inner circle” 
(Adamson, 2016). In this context, women tend to face discrimination because of the threat 
they pose on the status quo (Adamson, 2016; Konrad et al., 2008). Although the nature 
 19 
of these networks is strictly informal, evidence of the existence of such networks is found 
in several countries, such as the United States, Korea, and Norway, to highlight a few 
(Konrad et al., 2008; Ahn et al., 2017; Huse, 2011). Furthermore, the scope of these 
networks may differ significantly, but the common denominator is that the social ties are 
established and maintained to influence corporate decisions or external decisions that may 
affect the corporation or the individual within the network (Ahn et al., 2017). These 
relationships may be external, with executives, government officials, directors or media 
representatives, or internal, between the CEO, other executives and board members (Ahn 
et al., 2017). 
 
A challenge raised by authors is how to shift from a relationship-based selection of 
candidates to a system based on merit and expertise (O'Neal & Thomas, 1995). O’Neal 
and Thomas (1995) found that most directors are appointed based on personal, 
professional and social networks. Consequently, many corporate boards seats in different 
firms are held by the same group of men, which increases demographic homogeneity 
across companies. In addition, companies where recruitment is network-based may not 
receive the most competent and qualified leadership. In relation to executive appointment, 
Ahn et al. (2017) found that CEOs prefer candidates with similar regional and educational 
backgrounds and previously established social ties, supporting the old boys’ network 
theory. Similar findings have also been linked to homophily effect and social identity 
theory, which are discussed in more detail later in this chapter (Elsaid & Ursel, 2011; 
Byrne et al., 2019). Therefore, as old boys’ networks govern board and executive 
appointments, it may be challenging for women to attain higher ranking positions. 
However, preserving male predominance in cultural and social norms is not the only 
driver for this behavior. Researchers have also identified some tangible ramifications that 
cause men in these networks to feel threatened (Adamson, 2016).  For instance, because 
women receive notably lower compensation, male executives fear that their salaries and 
other benefits would decrease as a result of more women entering the upper echelons of 
corporations (Lalanne & Seabright, 2011). Thus, keeping women away from the 
corporate elite may be an attempt to preserve the higher compensation and benefits to 
which men are accustomed.  
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Recently, however, an opposite trend has also been identified by scholars. Huse (2011) 
argues that the introduction of board gender quotas in Norway has caused a group referred 
to as the “golden skirts” to replace the traditional old boys’ network. The term “golden 
skirts” describes a group of women that hold directorships on multiple boards (Huse, 
2011). In fact, Huse (2011) found that there are now more women than men holding 
positions on multiple corporate boards in Norway. Simultaneously, this means that the 
total number of women on boards of directors remains lower than that of men. The golden 
skirt effect has also been acknowledged in Italy, where quota legislation for boards has 
also been enforced (Rigolini & Huse, 2019). Whereas the old boys’ network theory argues 
that the power positions are preserved though deliberate efforts to maintain a status quo, 
the golden skirts effect is argued to be the result of institutional pressures (Rigolini & 
Huse, 2019; Huse, 2011). Particularly in countries where quota legislation is enforced, 
companies struggle to increase female representation on boards sufficiently enough to 
meet the requirements. Therefore, instead of demand for female leaders increasing 
organically, firms are forced to fill the female board seats fast. This results in the 
appointment of the most experienced women to as many boards as possible. While this 
increases appointment based on merit, it also decreases board independence (Huse, 2011).  
 
Indeed, appointing executives and directors from a select elite network can decrease the 
chances of outside candidates to be chosen. Rigolini and Huse (2019) discovered that a 
significant percentage of women directors in Italy had a close relationship with the firm 
founders (21%) or the same elite educational (40%) or family background (31%). 
Furthermore, over half of the sample were connected to organizations closely involved 
with recruitment of female directors (Rigolini & Huse, 2019). While dismantling and 
replacing institutionalized patriarchal networks could be seen as a positive movement 
towards enabling more female leadership, the golden skirts’ network appears 
controversial.  As seen in the literature, golden skirts may present a fast remedy for the 
gender imbalance issue. However, it may also decrease the chances of women outside the 
network to attain high ranking positions. Indeed, the case of Italy demonstrates how 
educational and social backgrounds become dominant variables in the selection of female 
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directors, which allows top level advancement only for a limited group of women. On the 
other hand, Rigolini and Huse (2019) argue that the diversity and number of female 
directors have increased with the introduction of quota legislation. This development 
may, however, be attributed to the low initial representation of female directors in Italy.  
 
The literature also provides other indications that the situation may be changing. Recent 
findings show the golden skirts effect has decreased in Norway, indicating that the trend 
may have been a temporary and immediate result from the imposed gender quota 
legislation (Seierstad & Huse, 2017). In a study on the 10 highest executive positions in 
Fortune 100 companies, Bonet et al. (2019) found that females that rise to top executive 
positions, including director positions, internally do so faster than their male peers. This 
may indicate that recent institutional pressures have, in fact, increased the demand for 
female executives and directors. This has resulted in firms offering promotions to women 
more frequently. Although these barriers still exist in some firms, a positive trend for 
female appointment seems to be emerging. Furthermore, Bonet et al. (2019) seem to 
suggest that potential candidates are likely to rise from within companies. Consequently, 
internal promotion could also drive gender spillover effects. However, the compensation 
gap between male and female executives still hinders the career mobility of women, 
which is discussed next.  
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2.2.2.4. Gender compensation gap 
 
Although positive development has occurred in compensation equality over the recent 
years, the literature shows that the discrepancy in compensation between male and female 
CEOs is a significant hindering factor in organizational advancement for women 
(Adamson, 2016). Keloharju, Knüpfer and Tåg (2016) present rich insight into gender 
differences in CEO and executive pay in culturally similar context of Sweden (Keloharju 
et al., 2016). Interestingly, in Sweden, which is considered one of the most egalitarian 
countries, the average salary gap between male and female CEOs was 7%. What is more, 
the pay gap for non-CEO executives was 22%. According to the authors, the 
compensation discrepancy could not be explained by differences in personal 
characteristics or qualifications of the male and female executives. Thus, there are no 
rational grounds to why women still receive less compensation for their work than men. 
 
A large gap in executive compensation may be an indication of a non-inclusive corporate 
culture, which can have substantial implications in attracting female CEO candidates 
(You, 2019). Thus, known differences in compensation may discourage women from 
aspiring to top executive positions and signal that they are not as valued as their male 
peers (You, 2019). Consequently, women may not voice their opinions as strongly, 
placing them at a disadvantage in the competition for upward movement in the 
organization (You, 2019). The same phenomenon is present in boards of directors, where 
women directors are less likely to voice their opinion in the CEO appointment process 
when the compensation gap is larger (You, 2019). On the other hand, men may perceive 
the lower compensation of females as a threat to their own higher salaries, due to which 
they may tend to advocate for male candidates instead of females (O'Neal & Thomas, 
1995). Thus, in order to bridge the gap between male and female CEO appointments, 
equal pay should be used as a tool to signal organizational inclusiveness and equal 
opportunity. While equalizing financial incentives is one way to encourage females in 
leadership, there are several individual level challenges on the way. The next part 
discusses these micro-level influences in more detail.  
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2.2.3. Micro-level influences  
 
As explained by Jeurissen (1997), macro, micro and meso-level influences are 
intertwined. This can be seen especially in how individual level influences have been 
shaped by institutions, organizations and society. As expressed by Keloharju, Knüpfer 
and Tåg (2016), the personal challenges that females face may include educational 
decisions, career aspirations, risk aversion, and parental responsibilities. In this section, 
three relevant concepts are highlighted from the literature, which all influence the ability 
of women to rise up the corporate hierarchy. First, work-family conflict is discussed 
particularly from the individual perspective (Byrne et al., 2019). Second, literature on 
female managerial aspirations is examine (Hoobler et al., 2011). Finally, the submissive 
behavior of women as the minority in a group is explored  (Asch, 1951; Oakley, 2000).  
 
 
2.2.3.1. Work-family conflict 
 
Gabaldon et al. (2015) list work-family conflict as one of the major obstacles for women 
in the workplace. Due to societal and biological reasons, women face difficult personal 
choices when it comes to career advancement. The literature shows that women 
contribute more hours to family related activities, while also contributing the same hours 
to work as men (Gabaldon et al., 2015). Keloharju, Knüpfer and Tåg (2016) also 
discovered that female executives experience more interruptions in their careers and have 
acquired less work experience compared to male executives. Furthermore, the authors 
found this to be true despite female executives having fewer children and a lower 
likelihood of being married than men. This is a further indication that parental 
expectations continue to differ for men and women, due to which women face more 
weighty decisions between careers and family.  
 
Byrne et al. (2019) highlight another aspect of work-family conflict, which is referred to 
as maternal femininity. This refers to female CEOs connecting their personal experience 
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of motherhood to their role as CEO. In some cases, this was found to have a negative 
impact on their legitimacy within the firm, as it highlighted feminine characteristics. 
Combining work and personal life may be a significant obstacle for females accepting a 
CEO position due to physical, emotional and social reasons. Firstly, balancing the 
workload with time required to successfully carry out executive duties is difficult to begin 
with (Byrne et al., 2019). Secondly, female CEOs often perceive this challenging not only 
from a time-management standpoint, but also from an emotional standpoint by feeling 
guilt for not being present for their children (Byrne et al., 2019). Thirdly, a vast amount 
of social pressure is still placed on female CEOs, who were found to face judgement and 
criticism for taking on the time-consuming professional role instead of focusing on the 
traditional family-oriented roles expected from women (Byrne et al., 2019).  Looking at 
the literature, it can be concluded women tend to invest more time in family matters, 
while devoting the same hours to their leadership tasks. This may be one of the triggers 
for the perceived low managerial aspirations of women, which is discussed next.  
 
 
2.2.3.2. Managerial aspirations 
 
The role of managerial aspiration is critical in research on CEO appointment, as it serves 
as a strong predictor for organizational upward movement (Fritz & van Knippenberg, 
2019). The literature in this stream offers the general consensus that traditionally, women 
are perceived to have less ambition to attain managerial roles (Hoobler et al., 2011; 
Heilman, 2001). Therefore, at the micro-level, women are often perceived not to want to 
compete for top leadership positions.  
 
However, the degree of managerial aspiration of women is often shaped by macro and 
meso forces. A stream of literature suggests that the perception of women having weaker 
managerial aspirations may influence the degree of organizational support that they 
receive, which negatively feeds into their actual motivations (Hoobler et al., 2011; 
Heilman, 2001; Adamson, 2016). Hoobler et al (2011) studied Fortune 500 companies to 
understand how the perceptions of the “opt-out” theory may affect upward movement in 
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the organization for women. The authors found that managers consistently perceive 
women as less motivated than men. Subsequently, men received more organizational 
support for personal development which put them on track to advance to higher 
management positions. This, in turn increased their aspiration to aim for higher ranking 
management positions, while women without a similar support system experienced a 
reverse reaction (Hoobler et al., 2011). The perception that women have less ambition for 
managerial roles may, in fact, be a result of females traditionally having less promotional 
opportunities and therefore less managerial experience (Adamson, 2016).  
 
Hoobler et al. (2011) validated the correlation between opportunities for organizational 
development and managerial aspiration, showing that individuals who receive 
challenging tasks, training and encouragement in the firm are likely to aspire to higher 
positions. In line with these findings, effective management, good communication and a 
strong corporate culture are also seen as catalysts for building organizational 
identification. This refers to the emotional commitment to the organization and the 
psychological ownership for the successes and failures of the firm (Hamzafic, 2018). 
Holding this true, companies which direct organizational development opportunities 
towards both genders equally should also see more managerial aspiration from women.  
This idea is validated by Fritz and van Knippenberg (2017) who linked managerial 
aspiration to organizational identification theory. In fact, contrary to the preconception 
that communal orientation directly reduces managerial aspiration, the findings suggest 
that communal orientation may strengthen the leadership aspirations under favorable 
organizational conditions (Fritz & van Knippenberg, 2017). Particularly when moderated 
by organizational identification, the levels of managerial aspiration appeared higher for 
women than men (Fritz & van Knippenberg, 2017). This indicates that companies that 
devote attention to building a strong culture where employees are equally engaged, should 
experience more ambition from employees to perform well and move upward in the 
hierarchy. 
 
At the micro-level, women have to constantly navigate paradoxal expectations set by 
organizational and institutional pressures. The literature shows that token women that 
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perform well in “masculine” positions face discrimination, whereas men in the same 
positions are praised (Heilman, 2001). This is also referred to as a double-bind, which is 
a situation caused by a behavioral norm where an individual is prevented from reaching 
a favorable outcome regardless of their actions (Adamson, 2016). In fact, double-binds 
have historically been leveraged to deliberately oppress women, who have been the less 
powerful individuals (Adamson, 2016). Placing these constraints on women leaders not 
only hinders their upward movement within the organization but may also impede their 
performance, further strengthening the destructive stereotypes (Heilman, 2001).  
Therefore, the incentive for women to aim for leadership positions is reduced. In addition, 
the literature highlights the tendency of women to exhibit submissive behavior compared 
to men, which is the last micro-level factor and is explained next. 
 
 
2.2.3.3. Submissive group behavior 
 
Traditionally, women have been expected to adapt and blend in rather than voice ideas 
(Oakley, 2000). Consequently, competent females may not stand out from a pool of 
dominant males. This behavior has been judged as an indicator of low managerial 
aspiration, however, it may instead reveal a traditional group dynamic setting between 
majority and minority group members. In fact, many studies have validated that when 
minorities consist of only one or two members, they tend to conform to the majority 
opinions due to group pressure dynamics and the fear of discrimination or hyper-scrutiny 
(Asch, 1951; Asch, 1955; Torchia et al., 2011; You, 2019). Studies on social conformity 
and group pressure aim to explain some of the behaviors that occur when females are 
treated as tokens in a company (Asch, 1951; Asch, 1955). Asch (1951) explains how 
submissive behavior in groups may lower the degree of subgroup influence, whether it be 
females or other minorities. In an experimental study, Asch (1951) found that 11 out of 
12 times when the rest of the group agreed on the answer that was wrong, the subject 
would conform to the group opinion despite knowing the right answer.  
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While group dynamics vary significantly based on differences in the personal 
characteristics of the members, studies on group pressure demonstrate the tendency for 
submissive behavior of numerical minorities (Asch, 1951). This theory has later become 
the basis of much of the research on critical mass in organizational gender studies (You, 
2019). Social conformity explains the conditions in which female directors are included 
in the decision-making process for CEO appointment, but they still tend to conform with 
majority opinions rather than voicing opposing views. On the other hand, this may show 
why females struggle to indicate their interest and competence for managerial and 
executive roles.  
 
Each of the theories presented in this section can affect the work of women on boards. 
Therefore, a stream of literature has developed particularly on this topic. The following 
section takes a closer look at this pool of literature, which moves the discussion closer 
towards the empirical part of the study. 
 
 
2.3. Gender spillovers in top leadership 
 
So far, this literature review has established the main reasons that challenge career 
mobility for women. From this point onwards the focus will be specifically on the 
literature that directly contributes to the theoretical framework for the empirical part of 
this study. The idea of gender spillovers was first introduced by Matsa and Miller (2011) 
who discovered that the number of female directors has a positive causal relationship with 
female CEO succession. Based on this idea, several other contributions have been made 
on how women support women in corporate leadership to increase their numerical 
representation altogether. This part includes a review of the key research on board gender 
composition, gender and CEO succession, and finally, board gender composition and 
CEO succession. The key research in this stream is summarized in Table 3.  
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2.3.1. Women on boards 
 
This study aims to understand the effect of women on boards on female CEO succession. 
Thus, it is important to understand the key stream of literature developed specifically on 
women on boards. Some authors argue in the favor of critical mass, demonstrating that 
reaching a certain threshold of female members is enough to facilitate change (Kanter, 
1977; You, 2019). Others have argued that more important than critical mass on corporate 
boards is the proportion of women compared to men (Lafuente & Vaillant, 2019). Authors 
have also found other director characteristics that may offset the effect of gender, which 
may be central in explaining the board diversifying process (Zhu et al., 2014). The 
literature shows that board composition and demographic similarity are key constructs in 
the CEO succession process, which may ultimately determine the gender of the appointed 
CEO.  
 
With tokenism still taking place on corporate boards in many countries, scholars have 
begun to investigate the number of women it takes to have an impact in the corporations 
in areas such as innovation (Torchia et al., 2011), financial performance (Lafuente & 
Vaillant, 2019), and female CEO appointment (You, 2019). Kanter (1977) was the first 
to introduce the idea that the behavior of female directors is dependent on their numerical 
representation in corporations. Once the minority subgroup, such as females on a 
corporate board, reaches a certain size, the group dynamic changes resulting in the 
minority gaining a larger degree of influence (Kanter, 1977). This threshold number after 
which qualitative changes in behavior can be detected is called critical mass. (Kanter, 
1977). Although the theory was initially introduced decades ago, these findings have been 
validated in several recent studies (Konrad et al., 2008; You, 2019; Torchia et al., 2011).  
 
Indeed, the critical mass theory illustrates how power can be gained through numbers. 
Consequently, many researchers have aimed to understand the numerical threshold at 
which the power of minorities significantly increases. Many studies have followed the 
findings of Asch (1951), who approached group dynamics by studying how social triggers 
affect submissive and independent behavior in groups among male university students. 
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In terms of the effect of numbers, Asch (1955) discovered that when an individual’s 
opinion was opposed by one, the effect was minor, whereas with two in the opposition 
the opinion of the individual was changed 13.6% of the time. More importantly, when the 
opposition consisted of three the individual’s opinion changed 31.8% of the time (Asch, 
1955). However, increasing the number beyond three had little effect on the results. 
Although the experiment was conducted on a male population, the theory has since been 
validated in gender equality studies in board rooms. According to Konrad et al. (2008), 
over 100 similar studies have since validated the number of three as the threshold of 
majority influence.  
 
The literature has also employed other methods to test the relationship between the 
numerical representation of women and their degree of influence. Some more recent 
research argues that the female to male ratio is a stronger indicator than a critical mass 
threshold for the degree of impact female directors exercise (Lafuente & Vaillant, 2019). 
Lafuente and Vaillant (2019) make the argument that having a female representation of 
40-60% on boards has a significant effect on the economic performance of companies.  
Indeed, the literature leaves the question unanswered whether absolute or relative 
measurement is more effective. Considering the previously presented arguments that 
most of the challenges that females face in male dominated groups stem from their 
minority position, it seems intuitive to focus on the ratio instead of concrete numbers. 
While boards may vary from 2-15 members, this can make a significant difference in the 
minority-majority dynamics.  
 
However, Cook and Glass (2015) present contradictory findings about the effect of the 
number of female directors on their degree of influence in Fortune 500 companies. In 
fact, the authors discovered no significant correlation between the number of female 
directors and the appointment of a female CEO. Instead, the authors argue that the relative 
influence held by women directors does have a positive impact on female CEO 
appointment. However, the number of female directors appears meaningful in supporting 
the performance of a female CEO (Cook & Glass, 2015). Overall, the findings on gender 
composition on boards are mixed. Although the requisite number of female directors 
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varies across studies, there are several indications that including women on boards has 
spillover effects in firms. However, some literature has shown how other demographic 
similarities between board members can exceed gender in importance. These factors are 
briefly highlighted in the following section.   
 
 
2.3.1.1. Board member characteristics beyond gender 
 
The literature also offers indications that gender may not be the most dominant factor in 
gaining influence on boards. Although demographic similarity plays a central role in 
board dynamics, similarities can be found in other demographic dimensions than gender. 
Indeed, scholars have found evidence of other director characteristics that may offset the 
effect of gender in director and executive appointments. For instance, Zhu, Shen, and 
Hillman (2014) argue that a woman is more likely to be appointed as a director the more 
demographic similarities they have with the other members of the board. These 
demographic factors may include the same ethnicity, educational background, or 
expertise in the same functional area (Zhu et al., 2014). Zhu, Shen, and Hillman (2014) 
draw on the recategorization theory, which aims to address the negative impact of social 
categorization of group members on the division into in-group and out-group members 
(Gaerner et al., 1989). The authors found that increasing diversity in one dimensions, 
gender in this case, may result in decreased diversity in other demographic dimensions, 
which may reduce the overall benefit of a diverse board. Nevertheless, gender and 
ethnicity are found to have a more substancial effects in the recategorization process, 
showing that if a candindate belongs to a minority in these dimensions, they need to 
posess more similarities in other dimensions (Zhu et al., 2014). This illustrates how 
seeking diverstiy contradicts the basic tendency to seek similarity.  
 
However, gender can also be seen as an asset in leadership particularly when it is treated 
as behavior rather than biology.  The following subsection elaborates on more 
contemporary views on gender in leadership, which may benefit women in the succession 
process.   
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2.3.1.2. Gender traits as behavioral characteristics 
 
The literature shows that gender remains a differentiating factor in business, particularly 
at the top of the corporate hierarchy. However, as several theories explain the differences 
of biological gender in the organization, others have treated gender as a behavioral 
measure. In recent literature, the study of gender effects has shifted from focusing on 
biological sex to a more nuanced view of gender as a collection of traits. Due to the 
change in societal and managerial norms, a shift in this traditional view has emerged in 
the literature, where gender in CEO succession is increasingly viewed as a balance of 
masculine and feminine traits (Adamson, 2016). Byrne et al. (2019) contribute to this 
view by demonstrating how gender in the workplace may be a product of social 
construction rather than the traditional assumption that people “bring gender to their 
jobs”. This refers to CEOs adopting femininities and masculinities in different tasks as 
CEO, which may have a significant impact on the succession experience (Byrne et al., 
2019) The authors view gender traits as non-binary and a result of action rather than 
biological sex, which challenges the stereotypical approach to gender in the workplace.  
 
Scholars have also found positive implications for femininity in CEO succession and 
legitimacy (Byrne et al., 2019).  In fact, the term relational femininity is used to describe 
an empathetic approach to leadership that emphasizes collective goals and sharing power. 
Aspects like fostering a problem-solving culture and investing time in gaining employee 
trust are associated to relational femininity and have been found to increase the legitimacy 
of a CEO among a variety of stakeholders (Byrne et al., 2019). Although the term is 
derived from characteristics traditionally associated with women, relational femininity is 
exercised by both male and female CEOs (Byrne et al., 2019). Furthermore, Byrne et al. 
(2019) introduce the concept of individualized femininity, which refers to women CEOs 
actively distancing themselves from their gender and reinforcing the idea of gender 
neutrality in performance, which is found to further increase their legitimacy. Fostering 
individualized femininity brings merit and competence into the center while potentially 
shifting focus away from gender stereotypes.  
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The contributions of Adamson (2016) and Byrne et al. (2019) are significant as they 
demonstrate a new approach to exploring gender in leadership. On the one hand, 
understanding that both genders can exhibit masculine and feminine characteristics can 
neutralize attituded towards leaders of different genders.  On the other hand, highlighting 
the positive aspects of femininity can increase the odds of female inclusion in top 
leadership. Female inclusion has, indeed, been a central theme in the literature on board 
composition. Moving forward, the focus of this study is placed on how gender factors 
into CEO succession.  
 
 
2.3.2. Gender and CEO succession 
 
As discussed previously, the primary task of the board of directors is to appoint the CEO 
of the firm. As a central topic in corporate governance, a vast amount of literature has 
developed around CEO succession. One of the central theories explaining the succession 
process is the institutional theory of action (March & Olsen, 1989)., which Ocasio (1999) 
applied to CEO succession.  
 
Ocasio (1999) leveraged institutional theory of action to explain how board decisions in 
the succession process are made according to formal and informal rules. In respect to 
corporate governance and CEO succession Ocasio (1999) highlights three dimensions of 
the theory. Firstly, it grounds organizational decisions in appropriate rules. Secondly, it 
emphasizes the role of history in creating the rules and processes behind organizational 
behavior. Thirdly, the theory underscores cognitive factors and organizational politics in 
the creation of rules. These dimensions partly explain why the demographic profile of 
corporate leadership has remained similar for decades. Moreover, Ocasio (1999) makes 
the important distinction between rational decision making and bounded rationality, 
which may coexist in the succession process. Although directors aspire to make informed 
and transparent decisions, their behavior is inevitably influenced by personal biases. 
Therefore, implicit discrimination may occur even when a strict protocol is followed.   
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From an agency perspective, CEO succession is seen as a tool for adjusting the course of 
managerial actions to follow the interests of the board (Ocasio, 1999). Concurrently, it 
can potentially have disruptive implications on organizational activity. As ambiguity and 
rapid change have become an integral part of business and strategic planning, the 
literature has also begun to focus on themes like role of succession planning and 
performance implications (Cvijanovic et al., 2020; Tao & Zhao, 2018) and the costs and 
benefits of inside and outside successions (Georgakakis & Ruigrok, 2016). To support a 
smooth transition process, Tao and Zhao (2018) suggest that a “relay succession” reduces 
volatility and enhances post-succession performance. This refers to the successor CEO 
being trained before appointment by the CEO in office (Tao & Zhao, 2018). The relay 
period is measured by the duration in years that the incoming CEO has been coached 
before entering the position, illustrating that succession plans are often confirmed years 
prior to the exit of the CEO predecessor (Tao & Zhao, 2018). Due to the longer relay 
period in inside appointments, the authors argue that inside appointments produce 
superior performance outcomes.  
 
On the other hand, Georgakakis and Ruigrok (2016) argue that causal relationships cannot 
be assumed directly between outside appointment and negative or positive organizational 
performance. The authors demonstrate that outside successions involve both challenges 
and benefits that may contribute to disruption or adaptation depending on the context. 
Surprisingly, Georgakakis and Ruigrok (2016) support the argument that outsider CEOs 
with similar demographic profiles to their predecessors yield better performance results 
post-succession. The authors argue that demographically similar successors are able to 
better integrate with the organization, which improves knowledge transfer and promotes 
positive financial performance. This may explain the reasoning for companies to maintain 
status quo in CEO succession and appoint male candidates after male CEOs. 
 
The literature also discusses the role of interim CEO succession, which often follows 
sudden CEO departures and thus differs from traditional succession modelling (Liang et 
al., 2012). As gender is defined equally important in interim succession in this study, a 
brief exploration into the literature is appropriate. While a planned succession is proven 
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to ensure the continuation of smooth operation and thereby enhance firm performance 
(Tao & Zhao, 2018), many firms still lack a succession plan at the time of CEO departure 
(Liang et al., 2012). To reduce ambiguity, political behavior and conflict caused by the 
absence of executive authority, companies have a common practice of appointing a 
trusted person as CEO until the successor is announced (Liang et al., 2012). Liang et al. 
(2018) conclude that interim CEOs are usually appointed from the board or executive 
team, and seldom from outside the company. Because the interim CEO is usually a trusted 
insider, this could potentially give female directors and non-CEO executives critical 
exposure to the CEO tasks. Liang et al. (2018) further found that well-performing interim 
CEOs are more likely to be offered a permanent position, while failure to perform 
increases the odds of the interim CEO leaving their organization. Thus, assuming an 
interim CEO position in a turbulent time is a high-risk career move, which may however 
give the chance for female directors and executives to prove their competence and attain 
permanent CEO positions.  
 
Overall, while previous studies have concentrated on the succession process from the 
perspective of financial performance, or the inside-outside appointment standpoint, not 
much literature has discussed gender as a systematic variable in the successor evaluation. 
Due to the unpredictable nature of CEO succession, scholars have emphasized the 
creation of rule-based frameworks aiming at minimizing uncertainty (Ocasio, 1999). 
Because of the ambiguity associated with leadership change, companies may perceive a 
higher risk in appointing a CEO with a significantly different demographic profile than 
what the company is accustomed to. In fact, the key theories in gender and CEO 
succession are built around the assumption of demographic similarity between the CEO 
and board members (Elsaid & Ursel, 2011). This favoritism towards similar candidates is 
explained by social identity theory (Elsaid & Ursel, 2011) or homophily (Byrne et al., 
2019). Based on this theory, if the prototypical group member is a middle-aged man, it is 
likely that the appointed CEO also fits this demographical description (Elsaid & Ursel, 
2011). These findings are in line with the discrimination literature presented earlier in this 
chapter. Due to the uncertainty associated with CEO change, risk aversion is central in 
the succession process. On the other hand, women have been found to produce better 
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long-term results because they are more risk averse. Therefore, although selecting a CEO 
successor of the opposite gender may be risky in the short term, it can offset the risk in 
the long term.   
 
As the above literature review shows, gender has not been considered a central factor in 
succession modelling. The contribution by Elsaid and Ursel (2011, p. 14) “has been to 
add gender variables to models of CEO succession”, which indicates that gender may not 
have been a central component in succession modeling in the past. Thus, further research 
is needed on gender in the CEO succession process. However, based on what is known 
on female CEO succession, the executive level in the firm constitutes a good pool of 
potential candidates. Thus, it could be assumed that the gender composition in executive 
teams may also factor into the succession process. The following section briefly examines 
previous research conducted particularly on the role of the executive team in CEO 
succession. 
 
 
2.3.2.1. Executive teams and female CEO succession 
 
While the roles and selection methods of the CEO and the board of directors are defined 
by Finnish law, the executive team is a voluntary entity which is not regulated. In Finland, 
executive team members can be chosen by the board or the CEO, but most often this is 
done in cooperation. Looking at female CEO appointment, some authors recognize the 
importance of the executive team (Matsa & Miller, 2011; Milkman & McGinn, 2012). 
While the entity liable for appointing the CEO is the corporate board, the executive team 
composition may signal critical characteristics of the firm which may be central for the 
investigation. Firstly, increasing the number of executives of the minority gender is found 
to enable career advancement for other gender minorities within an organization 
(Milkman & McGinn, 2012). In addition, having more women on the executive team 
signals that the company accepts and encourages female leadership.  A company culture 
that fosters equal managerial opportunities is likely to attract more potential female CEO 
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candidates (You, 2019). Hence, the likelihood of appointing a female CEO could be 
assumed to increase based on the number of women on the executive team.  
 
Milkman and McGinn (2012) explain the importance of the executive team in creating 
gender spillovers by drawing upon social identification and the demographic similarity 
effect. These theories have been discussed previously in the context of directors and CEO 
appointment. The authors argue that women in superior positions enhance the career 
mobility of junior professionals. Consequently, more women are promoted and become 
part of a wider pool of candidates for top level positions. In line with this, Matsa and 
Miller (2011) allege that the increase in female CEOs can be the result of companies 
having a larger supply of woman managers. Therefore, increasing the number of women 
at the executive level should be a significant driver of wider gender spillover effects. 
Firstly, boards that have seen the positive contribution and fit of female executives are 
more prone to appoint a female as CEO. Secondly, a larger number of female executives 
indicate that the company understands the added value of diversity and female 
advancement. Thirdly, an increased number of female executives provides a larger pool 
of potential CEO candidates with relevant experience.  However, the direct or indirect 
effect of the executive team composition on the selection of female CEOs remains 
relatively underexplored in the literature.  
 
In terms of the succession process, the board of directors has received more attention. 
One central aim of this thesis is to investigate how board gender composition affects 
female CEO succession. Therefore, it is critical to understand how the topic is treated in 
the existing literature, which is explored in the final section of this chapter. 
 
 
2.3.2.2. Board composition and female CEO succession 
 
The literature suggests that increasing the number of female directors has a positive effect 
on the likelihood of appointing a female CEO. Matsa and Miller (2011) were among the 
first to investigate the causal relationship between increasing the number of female 
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directors and the board appointing a female CEO. The authors found that increasing the 
proportion of female directors by 10 percent would grow the probability of a female CEO 
being appointed by 0.2-0.4 percentage points. Based on this finding, the Matsa and Miller 
(2011) developed the gender spillover theory, which suggests that female directors impact 
the appointment of female executives. Although the effect seems minor, it provides a 
solid foundation for the argument that increasing female representation in the corporate 
upper echelons has positive spillover effects to other executive positions. Elsaid and Ursel 
(2011) also investigated the effect of board gender composition on female CEO 
appointment. The authors confirmed that the number of female directors has a positive 
effect on the likelihood of appointing a female CEO.  
 
Building upon the findings of Matsa and Miller (2011) a few scholars have focused on 
investigating the number that is required to increase the influence of female directors in 
CEO succession decisions. However, the literature seems to suggest that numbers alone 
are rarely sufficient in predicting the likelihood of female CEO succession. For instance, 
Gupta and Raman (2019) discovered that a larger number of female directors increases 
the likelihood of female CEO appointment only when the CEO comes from within the 
board. This indicates that rather than gaining more influence, a larger number of female 
directors contributes to a larger pool of potential candidates (Gupta & Raman, 2017). 
Similar findings were produced by Elsaid and Ursel (2011) who discovered that 
appointing successors from outside the firm is unlikely to increase the likelihood that the 
appointed CEO is a woman. You (2019), on the other hand, found that the odds of female 
CEO succession increased significantly when a critical mass of women was present on 
the board, in addition to the firm exhibiting a high degree of female friendliness. This was 
measured by the gender pay gap, the number of female executives, and the linkages of 
male directors to companies with female CEOs. Therefore, it seems that board gender 
composition may have a central role in female CEO succession, however, the effect is 
often strengthened by other variables.  
 
However, some research also indicates that female directors can exercise high degrees of 
influence and use their networks in CEO succession without the coalition of a group of 
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women. Cook and Glass (2015) argue that the relative influence of female directors, 
measured by their links to other boards, has a significant positive effect on appointing a 
female CEO. This supports the idea that female CEO appointment is connected to the 
networks possessed by women directors. Liu (2014) contributes to this idea by showing 
that well-networked female CEO are more likely to be chosen due to their ties to board 
members. Liu (2014) provides empirical support to the argument that increasing the 
number of female directors to three or more increases the diversity of considered external 
candidates through their social networks. However, Cook and Glass (2015) only find 
what they refer to as a “marginal positive relationship” between the number of females 
on boards and female CEO appointment. To determine the significance, these authors use 
p>0.10, which is not a generally accepted significance level. Thus, the reliability of this 
finding can be questioned.  
 
On a general level, research on board composition and CEO succession suggests that 
female directors are linked to the selection of female CEOs.  In addition, some findings 
support the hypothesis that female executives increase the likelihood of female CEO 
appointment. However, a closer look at the literature reveals several shortcomings, which 
render the formulation of an overarching theoretical framework challenging. First, the 
findings are mixed regarding the impact of critical mass and the relative influence of 
networked female directors. It remains unclear whether there may be a certain threshold 
that significantly increases female influence, or whether influence is always relative. 
Thus, it is difficult to build a predictive model on how board characteristics influence 
CEO gender. Comprehensive research has been conducted on the macro, meso and micro 
influences that shape career advancement opportunities for women. Yet, relatively little 
research has been conducted on the effect of board gender composition on CEO 
succession to date.  
 
Furthermore, most studies have focused on Fortune companies in the United States, 
whereas other markets have received less attention in the literature (Table 3). Thus, 
further insights are called for from different national contexts. As a forerunner in political 
representation of women and a generally highly egalitarian country, Finland is a 
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theoretically interesting country of focus. Several public authorities and organizations 
have conducted investigations into gender equality in the upper echelons of corporations 
in Finland (Halttula & Saikkonen, 2020; Teräsaho & Kupiainen, 2015; Turunen & 
Linnainmaa, 2018). These reports have repeatedly shown that although Finland performs 
amongst the top countries in gender equality on boards of directors, an alarming lack of 
females still exists in top executive positions (Halttula & Saikkonen, 2020). While gender 
diversity reports on Finnish companies provide insights into the numerical representation 
of women in leadership, there is still limited academic research on this topic.  
 
Furthermore, the literature offers little empirical evidence on the role of the executive 
team in CEO succession. While little research has been conducted on this relationship, 
female executives have been linked to wider gender spillover effects in firms (Milkman 
& McGinn, 2012).  
 
To sum up, this study aims to contribute to these gaps by 1) investigating the effect of 
increasing the numerical representation of women directors, 2) focusing on publicly 
traded companies in Finland and 3) including the number of female executives into the 
predictive model of female CEO appointment.  
 
Table 3 Summary of previous research 
Topic Author 
(Year) 
Main Findings Country  
 
Women on 
Boards  
 
Gabaldon et 
al. (2015) 
 
Literature review found that little 
scientific evidence is found explaining 
country differences in allowing women 
to reach board positions 
 
 
 
International 
 
 
Grosvold & 
Brammer 
(2011)  
Board diversity is usually best enhanced 
by cultural and legal systems. 
International  
 
Iannotta, 
Gatti & 
Huse (2015) 
Board gender quotas are not sufficient 
for increasing female representation on 
boards 
 
Italy  
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Tyrowicz, 
Terjesen & 
Mazurek 
(2020) 
Leadership gender diversity differs 
between countries and the connection to 
cultural and equality institutions is 
mixed. 
 
 
International  
Tokenism Kanter 
(1977) 
Solo women on boards are likely to have 
less ability to influence board decisions 
 
USA  
Critical 
mass 
Konrad, 
Kramer & 
Erkut 
(2008) 
The degree of influence for women 
increases significantly when they reach a 
critical mass of three on boards. 
 
USA  
 
Lafuente & 
Vaillant 
(2019) 
Instead of critical mass, gender balance 
yields superior results in the impact of 
female directors. 
 
 
Costa Rica  
 
Torchia, 
Calabrò, & 
Huse (2011) 
Attaining the critical mass of three 
female directors has a significant 
positive relationship with firm 
innovativeness 
 
Norway  
CEO 
succession 
and gender 
Byrne, 
Radu-
Lefebvre, 
Fattoum & 
Balachandra 
(2019) 
Different ways of demonstrating gender 
in behavior can legitimize female CEO 
succession 
USA  
 
Georgakakis 
& Ruigrok 
(2016) 
Appointing a demographically similar 
CEOs to incumbents leads to better 
performance 
 
 
USA  
 
Keloharju, 
Knüpfer & 
Tåg (2016) 
Female and male CEO candidates have 
unequal opportunity to be appointed as 
CEO, which is not explained by personal 
characteristics 
 
 
Sweden  
Board 
composition 
and female 
Elsaid & 
Ursel 
(2011)   
Appointed CEO is more likely to be 
female the more females there are on the 
board of directors 
USA  
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CEO 
succession 
 
Gupta & 
Raman 
(2017) 
The likelihood of female CEO 
appointment increases with the number 
of female directors, but only when the 
CEO is appointed from the board 
 
 
USA  
 
Matsa & 
Miller 
(2011) 
The share of females on board increases 
the likelihood of women being appointed 
as CEO 
USA  
 
You (2019) the likelihood of female CEO 
appointment increases significantly 
when a board has a critical mass of at 
least three female directors. 
  
USA  
 
Cook & 
Glass 
(2015)  
A marginally significant positive 
relationship (p>0.10) exists between 
board diversity and the likelihood of 
female CEO appointment.  
USA  
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2.4. Hypothesis formulation and theoretical framework 
 
Based on the comprehensive review of the relevant literature, three hypotheses are 
formulated. As indicated by the key literature on board gender composition and CEO 
succession, the assumption is made that increasing female representation within the non-
CEO top leadership increases the likelihood of appointing a female CEO (Matsa & Miller, 
2011; Elsaid & Ursel, 2011). This fundamental assumption leads to the formulation of 
the first hypothesis (Figure 1): 
 
H1: The likelihood of appointing a female CEO increases when there are more female 
directors on the board of directors. 
 
Figure 1 Illustration of Hypothesis 1 
 
 
The second hypothesis is formulated based on the stream of literature that draws upon the 
critical mass theory (You, 2019; Kanter, 1977; Torchia et al., 2011). According to the 
critical mass theory, once the numerical representation of women directors reaches a 
certain threshold, the minority group gains more influence in decision making (Kanter, 
1977). Empirical findings show that the critical mass needed to incite change on corporate 
boards is three (You, 2019). Thus, the second hypothesis is formulated as follows (Figure 
2): 
 
H2: The likelihood of appointing a female CEO increases considerably once the critical 
mass of three or more female directors is achieved.  
Number of women Female CEO
+
Board of directors CEO selection
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Figure 2 Illustration of Hypothesis 2 
 
 
The literature seems to offer mixed findings on the relationship between board gender 
composition and CEO succession, which leads to the assumption that there are more 
explanatory variables in the equation than accounted for. For instance, You (2019) found 
that female friendliness in the firm was an indicator that strengthened the likelihood of 
female CEO appointment. This was measured by the gender pay gap, the number of 
female executives, and the linkages of male directors to companies with female CEOs. 
Furthermore, Gupta and Raman (2017) argue that the reason that the likelihood of female 
CEO succession increases with more female directors is that it provides more female CEO 
candidates. Matsa and Miller (2011) also highlighted the importance of managers in 
increasing the supply for female directors. Drawing upon the idea that an increased pool 
of candidates increases the chances of a female being chosen as CEO, the assumption can 
be made that a larger number of female executives would also have an impact on the odds 
of female CEO succession. Grounded in this assumption, the third hypothesis is 
formulated as follows:  
 
One woman
Female CEO
Two women
Three or more women/
Critical mass
Number of women
+
Board of directors
CEO selection
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H3: The likelihood of appointing a female CEO increases if there are more females in the 
top executive team and board of directors.  
Figure 3 Illustration of Hypothesis 3 
 
 
 
These three hypotheses present the theoretical framework that guides this study. Using a 
deductive approach, data were collected and tested to verify or reject the hypotheses. The 
following chapter highlights the methodological decisions and procedures that lead to the 
findings.   
 
  
Number of women Female CEO
+
Board of directors CEO selection
Number of women
Executive team
+
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3. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate how the likelihood of female CEO succession 
is affected by the gender composition of the board of directors and executive teams in 
companies listed on the Helsinki Stock Exchange. This study aims to test the gender 
spillover theory, that indicates that increasing the number of females in top corporate 
positions has a positive effect on female CEO succession (Matsa & Miller, 2011). This 
chapter is divided into three parts. The first describes the research approach, and the 
fundamental considerations of philosophical standpoints and research design. The second 
provides an in-depth description of the data collection procedures. The third section 
focuses on the analytical procedures, which is followed by a brief evaluation of the study.   
 
 
3.1. Research approach 
 
First, to understand the optimal methodological approach of this study, a careful 
consideration of the philosophical underpinnings shaping the study are in place (Antwi & 
Hamza, 2015). This entails defining the underlying ontological standpoints, which 
concerns our understanding of nature and reality, and the epistemological positioning, 
which refers to the understanding of how knowledge is produced (Creswell, 2015). The 
purpose of this study is formulated with the assumption that reality is objective and can 
be quantified using scientific methods. The aim is to understand what is true and false by 
empirical testing. In terms of the ontological underpinnings, this follows a positivist 
paradigm. According to the positivist worldview, human behavior can be explained by 
systematizing processes and relationships through reason and observation (Antwi & 
Hamza, 2015). While understanding that human dynamics are always more complex and 
context driven, the philosophical assumption entails that general trends in human 
behavior can still be identified using quantitative measures. 
 
From an epistemological standpoint, the positivist approach perceives science to be a 
systematic method to identify causal relationships and patterns in human behavior 
 46 
(Neuman, 2003). In terms of research design, a positivist approach aims at using objective 
methods to model how variables interact with one another in a quantifiable manner to 
produce an accurate approximation of reality (Antwi & Hamza, 2015). A central 
assumption in the positivist paradigm is that the researcher is independent from the 
subject of research, thus mitigating the effect of personal views and biases on the research 
(Sukamolson, 2007). With these underlying assumptions, the positivist paradigm uses the 
dimensions of validity, reliability, objectivity, precision and generalizability to evaluate 
the quality of studies (Sukamolson, 2007). While maximizing objectivity is a main 
concern in developing the methodology for this study, the notion that results may be 
influenced by personal biases and current environmental forces cannot be ignored 
(Sukamolson, 2007).  
 
The quantitative design is further defined keeping in mind the philosophical 
considerations. The research relies on secondary data, due to which it follows a 
nonexperimental design (Creswell, 2015). More specifically, the aim is to understand 
causal relationships between females on boards and executive teams and CEO succession. 
Thus, the nonexperimental quantitative research follows a causal-comparative research 
design (Creswell, 2015). In other words, it compares variables to find a cause for past 
events. The binary outcome, gender, makes testing the relationship between variables 
analytically more complex. The most appropriate method for testing the relationship 
between variables of this nature is binary logistic regression. Binary logistic regression is 
used to model the likelihood of the outcome being male or female based on the 
independent variables. Thus, the model identifies whether the predictors affect the 
probability of either outcome occurring.  
 
Both the research design and philosophical views influence the specific research methods 
employed in this thesis. The consideration of methods includes data collection, data 
analysis, interpretation and validation (Creswell, 2015). These aspects are discussed 
respectively in this chapter. In conjunction with data collection procedures, the variables 
and sampling decisions are described in detail. Before proceeding to the data collection 
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phase, the aims of the study are clarified by a brief description of the unit of analysis and 
the unit of observation.   
 
 
3.1.1. Definition of the unit of analysis and unit of observation 
 
Before proceeding further with the research design, a brief assessment of the unit of 
analysis and the unit of observation is in place. The definitions of the unit of analysis and 
the unit of observation are visualized in Virhe. Viitteen lähdettä ei löytynyt.. Unit of 
analysis is defined as the entity that is intended to be explained through the research 
(DeCarlo, 2019). In this case, the hypotheses aim to investigate how the gender 
composition of the board of directors and the executive team affect the likelihood of 
female CEO appointment. Thereby, the testing aims to identify what kind of gender 
composition is needed at the top levels of firms to appoint more female CEOs. Thus, the 
unit of analysis is on group level, in particular, the board of directors and the executive 
teams. On the other hand, the unit of observation is the entity which is focused on to 
derive insights about the unit of analysis (DeCarlo, 2019). The unit of observation is the 
individual, specifically counting female vs male directors.  
 
 
3.2. Data Collection 
 
Because the objective of this study is to examine past succession events, secondary data 
collection is the preferred procedure for this study. The descriptions of each phase of data 
collections and the definition of variables are detailed below.  
 
 
3.2.1. Sources of data  
 
As stated before, secondary data analysis is considered an appropriate approach for this 
study. Because of the robust disclosure obligation for listed companies in Finland, the 
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needed data are found from the annual reports of sample companies and publicly 
accessible online. According to the Finnish Financial Supervisory Authority (FIN-FSA), 
all companies whose securities are traded on the Helsinki Stock Exchange must provide 
timely, accurate and robust information regarding performance and governance based on 
the disclosure obligation regulated by the Securities Market Act, and the Market Abuse 
Regulation (Financial Supervisory Authority, 2019). The periodic disclosure obligation 
requires annual reports to be kept accessible online for at minimum 10 years after 
publishing. Therefore, the data used in this study were collected from the annual reports 
of companies listed on the Helsinki Stock Exchange. 
 
Before using the data, the quality and reliability of the data source was evaluated. Source 
criticism is particularly important in research because it can directly affect the validity of 
the study (Vilkka, 2007). Some fundamental questions in the evaluation are who produced 
and published the content and for what purpose (Vilkka, 2007). Because the disclosure 
obligation and the auditing requirements of annual reports, the information can be 
assumed accurate. Furthermore, recorded variables included objective measures on 
demographic characteristics, firm performance indicators, and board sizes, due to which 
they can be assumed unbiased. 
 
 
3.2.2. Collection procedures 
 
The data were collected directly and manually from the annual reports of each company 
listed on the Helsinki Stock exchange. Thus, the study can be considered a population 
study. This collection procedure is explained in detail first, followed by a thorough 
description of the specific variables chosen for analysis. First, the list of companies was 
extracted from the NASDAQ site on February 20th, 2020, after which a search engine was 
used to find the CEO and the year in which they were appointed. The gender of the CEO 
on directors was defined based on names, pictures or the prefix in the section of the annual 
report introducing the board of directors. The date of announcement was mostly 
determined from press releases and in some cases was stated in the annual report. For 
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events that occurred in the year 2019 for which annual reports had yet to be published, 
the composition of the board was recorded from the company website, taking into account 
the starting date of listed directors and executives. Hence, there may be slight 
discrepancies in case directors who were active in 2019 have ended their terms and are 
thus currently not listed on the website. There were large differences in the method of 
reporting financial and corporate governance information, where some were stated 
altogether in the annual report and others separated into a financial statement and 
corporate governance statement.  
 
The number of female directors was coded at the time of the appointment announcement, 
disregarding cases, for instance where a female director was appointed during the same 
month that the new CEO took office. Moreover, cases in which female directors had left 
the board one or more months before the appointment were excluded. The average age of 
directors was calculated based on the birth years listed on the reports. The ages were thus 
calculated to reflect the year that the appointment was announced. Furthermore, the 
number of female executives was recorded from the year previous to the succession 
announcement, in order to capture if causal relationship occurred. Furthermore, whether 
the appointed CEO was an internal or external hire was determined based on their listed 
previous work experience.  
 
Another consideration was the language of reports. According to the reporting principles 
for companies listed on the Helsinki Stock Exchange (NADAQ OMX, 2014), public 
releases and reporting must be conducted in Finnish or Swedish, unless a specific 
exemption is requested and granted for reporting in English. Only foreign companies are 
currently automatically exempt from this practice. Due to this, data were collected from 
reports in all three languages and the numerical values were recorded in an excel sheet. 
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3.2.3. The sample 
 
The research question aims to analyze historical events in order to formulate a model to 
predict future CEO succession events. The population that is studied includes all 
companies listed on the Helsinki Stock Exchange, which at the time of retrieval (February 
18th, 2020) consisted of 129 companies. Due to the small size of the population, all 
companies for which the defined data were available were included in the study. From 
the defined set of companies, all CEO succession events which were announced within 
the years 2015-2019 were included in the data set. This included CEOs appointed for an 
indeterminate duration as well as interim CEOs elected for the period before the successor 
took office. To identify if there were significant differences between the two types of 
successions, interim CEO succession was also controlled for with a dummy variable. The 
overall sample size of succession events in the period 2015-2019 amounted to 127, 
occurring in a total of 73 companies. Prior to analysis, the data set was cleaned from 
missing variables, after which the working data set consisted of 115 entries. Although the 
reported number of female CEOs in 2019 was 11, there were 15 succession events during 
the sample period. This is explained by two female CEOs in the sample being appointed 
only for an interim period and two being already replaced by men.  
 
 
3.2.4. Variables  
 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate how the likelihood of female CEO succession 
is affected by the gender composition of the board of directors and executive teams in 
companies listed on the Helsinki Stock Exchange. In order to test the constructed 
hypotheses, the key variables are defined (Creswell, 2015). All variables are described in 
Table 4, along with their codes, measurement and data type.  
 
The dependent variable in the binary logistic regression is the gender of the appointed 
CEO, coded as a dummy variable where females are coded as “1” and males as “0”. 
Because the regression is conducted in three stages, three regression coefficients are 
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tested separately. For the first hypothesis, the number of female directors is used as an 
ordinal variable. The second hypothesis tests the effect of critical mass on the board of 
directors, the independent variable is the number of female directors, which is coded as 
“1” for one female directors, “2” for two female directors and “3” for three or more female 
directors. Cases with no females on the board of directors is coded as “0”. The third 
independent variable represents the number of females on the executive team prior to the 
year of the CEO change announcement. This is coded as the number of female directors 
on an ordinal scale.  
 
Table 4 Model variables 
Variable 
Type 
Dependent 
Variable 
Description Measurement Data type 
Dependent 
variable  
CEOGEN Gender of appointed 
CEO, based on 
names, pictures or 
the prefix stated in 
annual report 
1=female, 
0=male 
Dichotomous 
Independent 
Variables 
FEMDIR The overall number 
of female directors 
at the time of CEO 
appointment. 
 
Number of 
female 
directors 
Continuous 
 MASS The critical mass in 
categories. 
0= no female 
directors 
1= one female 
director 
2= two female 
directors 
3= three or 
more female 
directors 
 
Categorical 
 FEMEX The number of 
female executives in 
the year prior to 
CEO appointment. 
Number of 
female 
executives 
Continuous 
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Controls BOARDSIZE Size of the board of 
directors 
Number of 
board 
members 
 
Continuous 
 EXSIZE Size of executive 
team 
Number of 
executive team 
members 
 
Continuous 
 DIRAGE Average age of 
directors 
Average of all 
directors 
 
Continuous 
 MALEIND 
FEMIND 
EQUALIND 
Gender balance in a 
given industry  
Dummy  Dichotomous 
 INCOMP Whether the CEO if 
from the company 
Dummy based 
on previous 
work 
experience on 
annual report 
 
Dichotomous 
 INBOARD Whether the CEO is 
from the board 
Dummy 
Dummy based 
on previous 
work 
experience on 
annual report 
 
Dichotomous 
 INTERIM Whether the CEO 
was an interim 
appointment 
Dummy based 
on information 
on annual 
report 
 
Dichotomous 
 ROE Performance, net 
income/shareholder's 
equity in the year of 
the appointment. 
ROE from 
annual report 
of CEO 
appointment 
year 
 
Continuous 
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 LARGECAP 
MIDCAP 
SMALLCAP 
Size of the firm Dummy, based 
on NASDAQ 
classification 
 
Dichotomous 
 YEAR 2015, 
2016, 2017, 
2018, 2019 
Year of appointment Dummy Dichotomous 
 
To establish the context in which the null hypothesis may or may not be rejected, selecting 
relevant control variables is critical. These control factors have been selected based on 
theoretical assumptions found from the literature.  Control variables are chosen to 
illustrate other conditions related to board composition, firm performance or industry 
factors, which may have an effect on the CEO succession process. Individual-level 
control factors for the selected CEO included whether they had previous work experience 
in the firm or not, and whether they were full-time or interim appointments. Further 
research is suggested to include individual-level variables such as nationality, which was 
not disclosed in all data sources and thereby excluded from the study.  The 
implementation of selected control variables serves two objectives – it reduces error terms 
which may occur by a simple uncontrolled regression analysis and eliminates potential 
alternative explanations for the phenomenon (Becker, 2005). The control variables used 
in this study are summarized in Table 3. 
 
Firstly, when looking at both critical mass and the total number of female directors, 
controlling for board size is important for multiple reasons. First, controlling for board 
size shows if the effects are relative to board size, or if the count of women is a sufficient 
standalone measure.  In other words, if a significant effect is found, it may indicate that 
the female influence is gained by numbers when certain size conditions are met. 
Otherwise, the effect between female directors and female CEO can be assumed to occur 
regardless of the number of their male counterparts. Second, corporate governance 
literature accounts board size as a critical measure of board composition (Lipton & 
Lorsch, 1992). Scholars find that increasing the size of the board has a negative impact 
on board effectiveness (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992). Thus, it may be assumed that increasing 
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the number of females may be less effective if it increases the board size simultaneously. 
In addition, the size of the top executive team is controlled for.  
 
Other compositional measures are considered to be the ratio of independent directors and 
director age (Muchemwa et al., 2016). Because the majority of board members are 
mandated to obtain an independent status (Securities Market Association, 2015), and data 
on director independence were not comprehensively available, board independence is not 
included in the data set as a control variable. However, director age is controlled for to 
show whether age has an effect on the equation. Hence, the overall average age of 
directors is recorded. As stated by You (2019), the reasoning behind including a control 
for director age is that because younger directors are more aware of equality issues, they 
are more likely to favor female candidates compared to older directors.  
 
Thirdly, the industry receptiveness towards females may be a critical factor to control for 
as it may appear significant in the selection of a female CEO (You, 2019). Consequently, 
the receptiveness towards females on an industry level is included in the control variables. 
For example, Matsa and Miller (2011) argue that half of the correlation between the 
number of female directors and appointed CEOs can be explained by accounting for 
industry differences. Thus, three dummy variables were included for female dominated, 
male dominated and gender equal industries. The division was based on data retrieved 
from the labor force investigation conducted by Statistics Finland (2020), seen in Figure 
5, where N=2558. According to Statistics Finland (2020), industries with 40-60% men or 
women are considered equal industries, which was used as benchmark for the dummy 
variables. Industries where more than 60% were women were classified as female 
dominated, and respectively those with over 60% men were classified as male dominated. 
The companies were matched with industries based on the Industry Classification 
Benchmark (ICB) used to categorize companies in the Helsinki Stock Exchange (Finnish 
Foundation for Share Promotion, 2012). 
 
Fourthly, as the literature offered some indication that internal and external hiring would 
have a significant effect on female CEO selection (Gupta & Raman, 2014), the origin of 
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the selected CEO became a critical variable to control for. Whether the CEO comes within 
the company will be coded as a dummy variable where “1” represents CEOs that come 
from within the company and “0” CEOs that are appointed from external candidates. This 
information was retrieved from the description of the CEOs previous work experience on 
the annual report. In the coding phase, two cases occurred which required specifying the 
definition of an internal hire to someone who has been employed by the company at some 
point in the past despite having worked elsewhere directly prior to appointment as CEO. 
In addition, the distinction of whether internal hires come from within the board itself is 
to be controlled for, to identify whether the internal hires tend to result from internal 
upward movement or the increase in potential candidates within the board (Gupta & 
Raman, 2014). 
 
 
Figure 4 Gender representation Industry breakdown 2019  
 
(Statistics Finland, 2020) 
 
Fifth, a dummy variable was included to show if the appointment was for an interim CEO 
for the period until the new CEO was found or took office. As seen in the literature, the 
interim CEO may play a significant role in the succession process (Liang et al., 2012; Tao 
& Zhao, 2018), and it may give women an opportunity to gain exposure and experience 
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to the work of the CEO. In the data set, a total of 22 recorded events were interim CEO 
successions, of which 2 were female.  
 
In addition, two performance indicators are also included to control for firm 
characteristics. ROE (Return on Equity) is a commonly used measure of performance in 
academic research (Topak, 2011). Following the example of You (2019), ROE is chosen 
for this study to indicate the performance of the company in the year of CEO succession. 
In addition, a dummy variable is included to control for the size of the company. Firm 
size is divided into three categories, Small Cap, Mid Cap and Large Cap, based on the 
classification on NASDAQ. Several investigations use this division when reporting about 
the trends in gender equality in stock listed firms. Furthermore, there are noticeable 
differences in CEO, executive and director appointment trends depending on firm size. 
Thus, controlling for firm size in these three categories is critical, to identify if firm size 
effects the examined relationship. Lastly, to control for environmental changes that may 
have occurred within specific years, the year of CEO appointment is controlled for using 
a dummy for each year form 2015-2019. 
 
 
3.3. Data analysis  
The objective of testing is to investigate how the likelihood of appointing a female CEO 
is associated with having more females on executive teams and boards of directors. 
Ideally, this would create a model with the capability to accurately predict in which of 
two categories the event falls based on previous observations. Binary logistic regression 
is the most common statistical method used for this purpose (Sreejesh et al., 2014). Based 
on initial observation, the data seems to fit the three basic assumptions that are required 
for the use of binary logistic regression (Statistics, 2020). First, the dependent variable is 
dichotomous. Second, the independent variables for all tests are either continuous or 
categorical. Third, independence of observations exists for the recorded events. However, 
before proceeding to the regression analysis, further descriptive analysis is conducted on 
the sample. Firstly, descriptive statistics such as means, ranges, variance and standard 
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deviations are examined for non-categorical variables. Furthermore, the distribution of 
events in the sample is illustrated by firm size. Secondly, a correlation matrix on all 
variables is run to identify associations between variables and the possibility of 
multicollinearity. Consequently, a Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) analysis is conducted 
to examine possible multicollinearity between variables. Once the data fit is confirmed, 
logistic regression is performed using SPSS. 
Binary logistic regression is based on the logit transformation of the dependent variable, 
which creates a continuous logarithmic curve for which the regression model can be 
developed (Healy, 2006). Because the outcome variable is binary (1=female, 0=male), 
the outcome variable must be transformed using the logit function: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝜋) = log(𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑋) 
 
The regression model is displayed below (PennState, 2018). In the equation, Y is the 
binary outcome variable of CEO gender, where 𝑌𝑖 = 1 for female and 𝑌𝑖 = 0 for male. 𝑋𝑖 
represent the explanatory variables, which differ between models.  
𝜋 = Pr(𝑌𝑖 = 1 |𝑋𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖) =
exp (𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑖)
1 + exp ((𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑖)
 
There are several differences from a simple regression particularly in the interpretation 
of the logistic regression output (UCLA, 2020). The two primary values that are 
interpreted are the B values or log odds, and Exp(B) or odds ratios. Log odds can only be 
interpreted for their sign and magnitude, meaning whether and to what extent the 
relationship is increasing or decreasing. For further meaningful interpretation, the log 
odds are exponentiated into odds ratios. Odds ratios indicate the change in probability 
that occurs with the unit increase in the predictor, which gives a better estimate of the 
extent of the relationship. Omnibus Test of Model Coefficients and Hosmer Lemeshow 
tests are conducted to evaluate the model fit for each of the three models. The following 
chapter describes the findings from each step, starting from the descriptive statistics. 
However, before proceeding to the results and findings, an evaluation of the study is 
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presented, addressing concerns of data quality, ethical consideration and other procedural 
limitations of this research. 
 
3.4. Evaluation of the study 
 
3.4.1. Data quality 
 
To evaluate the quality of statistical results derived in this analysis, the key dimensions 
considered are validity and reliability. Reliability refers to the replicability of the study. 
Reliability measures can be further divided into two areas: external and internal 
reliability. External reliability means that the test can be generalized beyond this study. 
Internal reliability refers to the consistency of producing intended results. The reliability 
of results of logistic regression can be interpreted from the results of the 95% confidence 
interval (CI), which are presented in the following chapter. Validity on the other hand, 
refers to the accuracy of the measure in representing what it is intended to measure.  For 
a test to be valid, it must be reliable. In addition, two other general threats for validity are 
addressed for this study, which include sample size and determining causality.    
 
The first threat for validity of results concerns the size of the sample. In general, larger 
samples produce more reliable results. The sample included all succession events in 
Finnish Stock listed companies between 2015-2019 excluding only 12 cases with missing 
variables. Thus, it can be considered a population study. However, the low number of 
female CEO succession events (15) created notable challenges. Events Per Variable 
(EPV) is considered a standard method of evaluating the sufficiency of the sample for 
binary logistic regression (Harrell Jr, 2001). EVP refers to the number of events for the 
smaller outcome group relative to the number of estimated regression coefficients 
(Harrell Jr, 2001). A widely accepted minimal EVP value for performing binary logistic 
regression is ten, which is true with the single predictor in hypothesis 1. However, the 
categorial predictor for critical mass in hypothesis 2 contained four categories. In 
addition, hypothesis three had two predictors, which lowers the EVP. Van Smeden et al. 
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(2016) and Vittinghoff & McCulloch (2007) disputed the minimum EVP=10 principle 
showing that reliable results have been produced from EVP> 4. When EVP is low, the 
maximum likelihood coefficients may be inaccurate, due to which closer attention should 
be paid to the outcome and the strength of the correlation between the covariates (van 
Smeden et al., 2016). Based on these findings, the sample can be concluded as sufficient 
for testing, however, particularly hypothesis 2 and 3 may produce weaker results due to 
low EVP, which must be acknowledged in interpreting the results. 
 
The second key consideration for validity is capturing longitudinal data (Diggle et al., 
2002). This leads to important considerations of the date range and the procedures of data 
retrieval. From 2012-2014, there was only one female CEO in companies listed on the 
Helsinki Stock Exchange. Since then, the number has increased to 11 by 2019, 
constituting 8.9% of all CEOs in these companies. Therefore, the sample was collected 
on successions that were announced between the years 2015 and 2019. In order to capture 
longitudinal aspects, company data were collected from the annual report of the year of 
the succession announcement. To ensure causality of the results, the board composition 
was recorded from the time of announcement and executive team composition was 
recorded a year prior. In case companies in which multiple CEO successions had occurred 
within the sample time frame, all events were recorded. To identify possible year-specific 
changes in the variables, each year was controlled for using a dummy variable.  
 
 
3.4.2. Limitations  
 
Because of the sensitivity and complexity of issue of gender reveal some limitations to 
this study. Firstly, following existing research on female advancement in business, this 
study makes the binary distinction between male and female candidates. While “gender 
equality” and “gender diversity” are used in this thesis interchangeably to refer to the 
balance between men and women for analytical purposes, the wider non-binary definition 
of gender is acknowledged. Thus, from an ethical, political and societal standpoint, the 
binary representation of gender is considered a major limitation of this study (Zyphur & 
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Perides, 2017). Secondly, the research focuses on a macro perspective of gender equality 
by concentrating on compositional board characteristics in all publicly traded Finnish 
firms. Thus, the study excludes personal characteristics of CEO candidates which 
constitute a significant factor in CEO selection. Therefore, the study does not address e.g. 
the competence of candidates, which poses a major limitation of the study.  Furthermore, 
although the literature review addresses barriers for female advancement, including 
discriminatory behaviors, the study does not suggest that any of the sample companies 
specifically practice such behaviors. Instead, the literature review aims to highlight some 
of the common concepts found by researchers, which may or may not apply to the sample 
companies. Thus, the results of this analysis are suggested to be taken to highlight general 
patterns, and further research is needed to determine the causes of these developments.  
 
Secondly, the generalizability and transferability of the results to other contexts is a key 
issue discussed in the literature. For instance, Gabaldon et al. (2015) argue that little 
evidence currently exists explaining country differences in gender equality in top 
leadership. Therefore, because this topic has received little to no attention in the Finnish 
context, focusing the study on Finnish firms is justified. However, Tyrowicz et al. (2020) 
find that leadership diversity differs significantly between markets and the impact of 
institutions is different in each context. Therefore, taking into account the cultural 
context, the findings may not be generalizable across different countries. However, given 
that the results pass reliability tests, this study can be generalized in the Finnish context. 
Thus, they can be helpful in conducting comparative studies in the future.  
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4. FINDINGS 
 
This chapter presents the findings of the statistical analyses. The chapter begins with the 
explanation of the key insights derived from basic descriptive statistics. This includes 
correlation analysis, which illustrates how variables in the model correlate with one 
another. Furthermore, a multicollinearity test is run to ensure that independent variables 
are suitable for logistic regression. Finally, the findings from the binary logistic 
regression are presented for each hypothesis. The interpretation of these results is 
discussed in the following chapter.  
 
 
4.1 Descriptive statistics  
Several previous investigations capture the development of gender equality in Finnish 
stock listed firms as an annual snapshot (Turunen & Linnainmaa, 2018; Teräsaho & 
Kupiainen, 2015; Horttanainen & Kajala, 2020). However, these investigations have 
focused primarily on the numbers of female directors, executives and CEOs. While these 
findings have provided important insights into the current equality situation, they have 
not uncovered in detail the board and executive team composition at the time of CEO 
appointment. Unlike gender reports by Findix and the Finnish Chamber of Commerce, 
which focus on all stock listed companies, this research only considers the firms where a 
succession has occurred each year. Thus, the sample used in this thesis differs slightly 
from these investigations and particularly the descriptive statistics may not be directly 
comparable. However, the analysis presents some interesting findings regarding CEO 
successions, which is described first. 
 
4.1.1. Sample description 
First, basic descriptive statistics for all non-categorical variables are displayed in Table 
5. This includes the means, standard deviations, variances, and ranges of each variable. 
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Interestingly enough, while the number of female directors on a board ranges from 0-5, 
the mean is only 1.65 with relatively small variance (1.11). Similarly, with the range of 
female executives being 0-6, the mean is 1.51 with variance 1.95. The board size ranges 
from 3 to 11 members, whereas the executive team size, which is not dictated by law, 
ranges from 1 to 14 members. Director average age varies from 38.5 to 64.5. However, 
the mean, median and mode are all above 50 years. Many past investigations have further 
divided these findings by firm size, which brings more insight into the notable differences 
in all variables between firms of different magnitude. This is further illustrated with data 
displays (Section 3.3.3).  
 
Table 5 Descriptive statistics 
  
Female 
Directors 
Female 
Executives Board size 
Executive 
team size 
Director 
average 
age 
            
Mean 1,65 1,51 6,19 7,08 55,49 
Standard Error 0,10 0,13 0,17 0,27 0,39 
Median 2 1 6 7 55,6 
Mode 1 1 6 6 51,3 
Standard 
Deviation 1,05 1,40 1,78 2,89 4,16 
Sample Variance 1,11 1,95 3,16 8,34 17,28 
Kurtosis 0,37 2,24 -0,12 -0,08 1,62 
Skewness 0,60 1,36 0,39 0,41 -0,68 
Range 5 6 8 13 26 
Minimum 0 0 3 1 38,5 
Maximum 5 6 11 14 64,5 
Sum 190 174 712 814 6381,2 
Count 115 115 115 115 115 
 
Figure 6 displays how the succession events in the data were divided based on firm size. 
While 26 successions occurred in Large Cap firms over the sample period, the number of 
succession events in Small Cap firms was almost double. Thus, although large and small 
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firms had seemingly as many female CEO appointments, the precentral difference is 
significant. Of large firms 23% of appointments were women, whereas the number for 
small firms was 14%. Secondly, Mid Cap firms seem to follow a different trend, with 
only 2 female succession during the five-year period. The ratio of female appointments 
to all appointments is only 5% for midsized firms.  Thus, low number of female 
successions in Mid Cap firms can be expected to affect the regression results. 
 
Figure 5 CEO succession events by gender and firm size 
 
 
4.1.2. Correlation analysis 
Second, the correlation analysis brings further insight into how variables in the equation 
are associated with one another. Although the basic principle is similar, correlation differs 
significantly from regression analysis. While regression analysis aims to identify causal 
relationships between variables, correlation analysis only shows the degree to which 
variables related to one another (Creswell, 2015). However, correlation does not show 
cause, and relationships may involve other variables to fully explain the effect. 
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Furthermore, if a linear relationship exists between two variables, correlation does not 
show which variables causes the other. Thus, correlation analysis shows some bivariate 
associations in the data set to frame the following logistic regression analysis. Particularly 
important for logistic regression is that independent variables are not strongly correlated 
(Alin, 2010).  
The correlation table (Table 6) shows significant correlations between several variables. 
For the correlation analysis, dummies for firm size and industry are transformed into 
categorical variables.  CAP signifies firm size, where 1=Large Cap, 2= Mid Cap and 3= 
Small Cap firms. Similarly, the variable INDCODE is 1=female dominated, 2=equal and 
3=male dominated industries. Thereby, the sign of possible relationship indicates towards 
which end of the spectrum the correlation occurs.  
Firstly, the number of female members and all members of boards of directors and 
executive team have a moderate negative relationship with firm size at significance level 
0.05. This shows that the size of the board of the directors (-0.617) and executive teams 
(-0.535) shrinks when moving from large firms to small firms. Simultaneously, the 
number of woman directors (-0.525) and the number of woman executives (-0.360) 
decreases along with firm size. In addition, a weak negative relationship (-0.2) can be 
identified between firm size and director average age. Furthermore, smaller companies 
seem to have a slightly higher tendency (0.184) to appoint CEOs from within the 
company.  
In addition, the correlation matrix illustrates that the gender division in the industry is 
linked to variables like the number of female executives (-0.282) and directors (-0.261), 
and board size (-0.251). This shows that firms in female dominated industries tend to 
have slightly more female directors and executives than male dominated industries. In 
addition, board size seems to shrink slightly when moving to equal or male dominated 
industries.  
The regression matrix also shows interesting correlations between the number of females 
on boards and executive teams and the size of those teams. For the purpose of this study, 
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this brings insight into the number of females relative to the whole group, which may 
affect their degree of influence. A strong upward linear relationship can be found between 
the number of female directors and board size (0.717). As seen in Figure 7, when the 
number of women increases, so does the size of the board. Interestingly enough, the same 
trend, although more moderate, is seen in executive teams. Executive team size shows a 
moderate positive linear relationship (0.509) with the number of female executives. 
Moreover, board size is also positively correlated with executive team size. In addition, 
the number of female executives also seems to have a positive relationship with the 
appointment of female CEOs, with P value 0.228 at significance level 0.01. Overall, the 
correlation analysis seems to indicate that firms with larger boards of directors also have 
larger executive teams, and both entities seem to have more female members. In addition, 
the correlation matrix seems to indicate that the number of females in different units of 
observation are linked, which indicate that gender spillover effects may occur. 
Figure 6 Correlation between board size and number of female directors 
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level 0.01. this indicates a mild upward linear relationship between independent variables. 
According to Midi et al. (2013) multicollinearity becomes a serious issue in logit 
regression if correlation is greater than 0.8, however, it may occur with weaker 
correlations as well. Thus, additional testing is conducted to identify or rule out these 
concerns.  
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Table 6 Correlation table 
 
            
  CAP IND 
CODE 
CEO 
GEN 
FEM 
DIR 
BOARD 
SIZE 
FEM 
EX 
 
EX 
SIZE 
IN 
COMP 
IN 
BOARD 
DIR 
AGE 
ROE INT 
CAP 1 
           
             
INDCODE .120 1 
          
 
.201 
           
CEOGEN -.070 .015 1 
         
 
.457 .870 
          
FEMDIR -.525** -.261** .153 1 
        
 
.000 .005 .102 
         
BOARDSIZE -.617** -.251** .075 .717** 1 
       
 
.000 .007 .426 .000 
        
FEMEX -.360** -.282** .228* .445** .441** 1 
      
 
.000 .002 .014 .000 .000 
       
EXSIZE -.535** -.090 .007 .460** .526** .509** 1 
     
 
.000 .341 .937 .000 .000 .000 
      
INCOMP .184* .090 .020 -.135 -.265** -.036 -.032 1 
    
 
.049 .340 .828 .150 .004 .701 .737 
     
INBOARD .160 -.003 -.025 -.063 -.209* -.021 -.003 .371** 1 
   
 
.088 .978 .793 .506 .025 .822 .971 .000 
    
DIRAGE -.200* .142 -.050 .149 .168 -.052 .115 -.203* -.166 1 
  
 
.033 .131 .594 .113 .072 .583 .223 .029 .076 
   
ROE .146 .150 .058 -.030 -.101 -.299** -.112 -.063 .052 .095 1 
 
 
.120 .109 .537 .752 .281 .001 .235 .501 .580 .314 
  
INTERIM .015 .095 -.061 .008 -.097 -.119 .008 .106 .168 .043 .057 1  
.876 .318 .524 .929 .308 .208 .932 .264 .075 .648 .550 
 
  
The top row for each variable shows the bivariate Pearson Correlation. The bottom row for each variable shows the P value for each correlation. 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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4.1.3. Multicollinearity test 
As stated, a particular concern with the third model is multicollinearity. This refers to a linear 
relationship between two or more independent variables, which may distort the results of 
logistic regression (Alin, 2010). Generally, the likelihood of multicollinearity increases with 
the number of independent variables. However, although model 3 only contains two 
independent variables, the moderate correlation between FEMDIR and FEMEX may be a 
concern. Because high correlation can imply multicollinearity, Variance inflation factors 
(VIF) analysis is run to test for multicollinearity between the independent variables FEMDIR 
and FEMEX (Alin, 2010). Results from the VIF test can be seen in Table 7. VIF can be 
calculated as 1/Tolerance, which due to which if one value is 1.0, the other is as well. VIF 
equal to 1.0 indicates no multicollinearity between independent variables.  
Table 7 VIF test results for multicollinearity 
Variable Tolerance VIF 
FEMDIR 1.0 1.0 
FEMEX 1.0 1.0 
 
4.2 Regression results 
 
This thesis used binary logistic regression to investigate how the gender composition on 
boards of directors and executive teams is connected to the likelihood of female CEO 
succession. The method allows identification of causal relationships between the predictors 
and the probability that either of the binary outcomes occurs. Simultaneously, the method 
allows controlling for multiple variables that may have an impact on the model. The 
regression included three models, which were based on the three hypotheses presented 
before. Each model is evaluated in a separate subsection, looking at the model fit and the 
possible significant relationships in the model. The regression output for each of the three 
models can be found in Table 8. 
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Table 8 Logistic regression results 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3        
95% CI for 
EXP(B) 
Variable B Exp(B) B Exp(B) B Exp(B) Low Upper 
SMALLCAP 1.067 2.906 1.339 3.814 1.195 3.304 .230 47.402 
MIDCAP 3.124** 
(0.10) 
22.734** 
 
3.510** 
(0.09) 
33.459** 4.840** 
(0.08) 
126.406** 3.482 4588.493 
MALEIND -.598 .550 -.354 .702 -2.327 .098 .005 1.753 
EQUALIND -.056 .946 -.085 .918 -.882 .414 .026 6.703 
FEMIND             
  
BOARDSIZE -.057 .944 -.071 .932 -.212 .809 .393 1.666 
INCOMP .091 1.096 .060 1.062 .114 1.121 .223 5.638 
INBOARD .086 1.090 -.010 .990 -.214 .808 .089 7.286 
DIRAGE  -.104 .901 -.104 .901 -.073 .930 .775 1.116 
ROE .028 1.028 .029 1.030 .035 1.035 .988 1.085 
INTERIM .903 2.468 1.091 2.978 .941 2.561 .341 19.257 
YEAR 2015 -.795 .452 -.997 .369 .027 1.028 .067 15.737 
YEAR2016 1.752 5.768 1.683 5.383 3.249* 
(0.33) 
25.770* 1.291 514.376 
YEAR2017 .682 1.978 .690 1.994 2.105 8.205 .730 92.211 
YEAR 2018 .935 2.547 .773 2.166 2.179 8.836 .673 116.057 
YEAR 2019 
        
EXSIZE -.191 .826 -.268 .765 -.567* 
(0.46) 
.567* .325 .989 
FEMDIR .960 
(0.08) 
2.613     1.830* 
(0.26) 
6.231* 1.239 31.339 
MASS 0 
  
-21.552 
(0.998) 
.000 
  
    
MASS 1 
  
-2.521 
(0.105) 
.080 
    
MASS2 
  
-1.388 
(0.208) 
.249 
    
MASS 3 
  
 
(0.998) 
     
FEMEX 
    
1.178** 
(0.02) 
3.249** 1.537 6.866 
Pseudo R2 
(Nagelkerke) 
0.286 
 
0.240 
 
0.451 
   
Number of 
observations 
115   115   115       
 
The Table shows the B values and odds ratios (Exp(B)) for all variables in each model. 95% Confidence 
intervals are shown for the third model. ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. * Correlation is 
significant at the 0.05 level. P-value shown for significant variables in parentheses. 
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4.2.1. Hypothesis 1 
 
Hypothesis 1 states that the likelihood of appointing a female CEO increases when there are 
more female directors on the board of directors. Using the number of female directors as the 
only predictor, the first logistic regression is formulated. The Omnibus Test of Model 
Coefficients for Model 1 (Table 9)  shows Sig > 0.05, indicating a poor model fit. In addition, 
the Hosmer and Lemeshow Test for model 1 (Table 10) shows a low P value, which implies 
that the model fit is poor. The B value for FEMDIR in Model 1 (Table 8) is near 0, which 
implies that the relationship between the predictor and outcome is weak. In addition, the 
Female Director coefficient in (Table 9)  shows Sig=0.80, indicating that the relationship is 
non-significant. Thereby, controlling for the other variables in the model, the null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected. This implies that more predictors may be needed to create a model with 
stronger predictive capabilities.  
 
 
Table 9 Model fit by Omnibus Test of Model Coefficients 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Chi square 19.105 21.530 31.723 
df 16 18 17 
Sig .263 0.254 0.016** 
 
 
4.2.2. Hypothesis 2 
 
Hypothesis 2 states that the likelihood of appointing a female CEO increases considerably 
once the critical mass of three or more female directors is achieved. Again, the Omnibus Test 
of Model Coefficients (Table 9) shows a poor model fit for model 2. As seen in Table 8 
significance for all categories of the independent variable are considerably above 0.05. 
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Hence, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected with the current data. Taking a closer look at 
the sample, it is concluded that there an insufficient number of events in the outcome category 
of female CEO successions in all four predictive categories. Because the sample contains 
only 15 events that fall into the category 1 (female CEO) the number of Events Per Category 
(EVP) with four categories is low. Thus, the non-significant results are likely to be a result a 
low EVP.   
 
 
4.2.3. Hypothesis 3 
Hypothesis 3 predicts that the likelihood of appointing a female CEO increases if there are 
more females in the top executive team and the board of directors in the company. First, the 
Omnibus Test of Model Coefficients (Table 9) is evaluated to see that all models fit equally 
well (Sig < 0.05), where Sig. 0.016 indicates that the results are significant and the model fits 
well. While logistic regression does not produce an R2 value to quantify variance, it relies on 
different pseudo-R2 values to indicate the variance of the dependent variable that is 
accounted for by the model. Based on the Nagelkerke pseudo R square 0.463 (Table 8), the 
model accounts for 46.3% variance, which is considered good for the context. The Hosmer 
and Lemeshow Test for the third model further suggests a good model fit as the significance 
value 0.946 is notably above the widely accepted threshold value 0.05 (Table 10). Therefore, 
the model seems to be fitting and the results may be assumed reliable. Yet the slightly low 
EPV 7.5 in the multiple logistic regression must be acknowledged, as it may weaken the 
results. 
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Table 10 Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Chi square 8.818 5.958 2.800 
df 8 8 8 
Sig 0.358 0.652 0.946 
 
The predictive capability of the model (Table 11) shows that the model has significantly 
higher accuracy in predicting the appointment of male successions (96.9%), compared to 
female successions (33.3%). Overall, the percentage of correct predictions in the data set was 
85.4%. Considering the relatively small data set, particularly the small number of female 
succession events, this predictive capability can be considered relatively good.  
 
Table 11 Classification table for correctly predicted outcomes for model 3 
Predicted CEO gender Correct Incorrect 
Correct 
predictions 
Male 95 3 96.9% 
Female 10 5 33.3% 
Total 105 8 85.4% 
 
 
Because model 3 passes all model fit tests, a closer look is taken the logistic regression output 
(Table 8). First, looking at the significance values of the relationship of female directors 
0.026, and female executives 0.002 with female CEO appointment, both are determined 
significant with Sig<0.05. Thus, the relationships the dependent variable and both 
independent variables are significant and controlling for the variables in this model, the null 
hypothesis can be rejected.  
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The B coefficient shows the values for predicting the dependent variable from the 
independent variables. The higher this value is, the higher the likelihood that a female CEO 
is selected as a result of changes in the predictor. The B value for female directors shows a 
large increase (1.830) in the odds, while for female executives the increase is significant but 
smaller (1.178). The coefficients are in log-odds units, due to which they are converted to 
odds ratios for further interpretation. Euler’s constant to the power of B coefficient (Exp(B)) 
shows the odds ratio, that is, the exponentiation of the B coefficient. Exp(B) for female 
directors is (6.213 -1)x100%=521%, which shows that odds of female CEO appointment 
increase with one unit increase in female directors. Respectively adding one female to the 
executive team prior to CEO appointment increases the odds by (3.249-1)x100%=225%. To 
assess the estimate of the odds ratios for both predictors, the 95% confidence interval (CI) is 
examined. This measure shows that the odds ratio falls between the low and upper values 
with 95% confidence. The 95% CI for female directors is relatively wide 1.239-31.339, 
which may suggest the need for a larger sample size. However, the 95%CI for female 
executives is between 1.537-6.866, which gives a good estimate for where the odds ratio can 
accurately fall. Overall, controlling for all the variables in the equation, hypothesis 3 is 
supported. 
 
4.2.4. Control variables 
In addition to the confirmed relationship between the independent variables and dependent 
variable in hypothesis 3, there are some notable relationships present in the control variables 
which require a closer investigation. Not seen in Table 15, the average age of female directors 
was controlled for by eliminating entries without female directors. This test yielded 
insignificant results for female director average age. All other control variables are shown in 
Table 15. Significant relationships (Sig < 0.05) are found in three variables: Mid Cap firms 
(Sig=0.008), year 2016 (Sig=0.033), and executive team size pre-appointment (Sig=0.46).  
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Firstly, by examining the B coefficient for Mid Cap firms, a significant positive relationship 
is identified. Exp(B), however, shows a drastically high odds ratio (126.406), which, again, 
is most likely a result of data limitations. While there are only two female succession events 
in this category, the results are consequently drastic. Thus, conclusive results cannot be 
drawn from this finding.  
Secondly, year of succession announcement was controlled for to identify possible 
significant differences related to the time frame. Table X indicates significance in the control 
for 2016. While the B value 3.249 shows a significant positive increase in the dependent 
variable, Exp(B) = 25.770 is extremely high. This may indicate that in 2016 the relationship 
between female representation on executive teams and boards began to have more influence 
in female appointment decisions. The data shows that number of female appointments 
increased after 2015, as did the number of female executives. The results may indicate that 
this increase occurred in the same firms in 2016, which caused the relationship to strengthen 
in that year. However, this finding is inconclusive. 
Thirdly, the size of executive teams prior to the CEO appointment shows a significant 
relationship with the dependent variable, however, Sig=0.046 is only slightly below the 
guideline of 0.05. The B value -0.567 shows a decreasing relationship. Consequently, the 
odds ratio 0.521 shows that increasing the size of the executive team decreases the odds of 
female CEO appointment by 52%. 
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5. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS   
The analysis brought several insights for the purpose of this study. The results of the logistic 
regression analysis indicate that the number of women on boards and executive teams 
combined have the strongest predictive accuracy in estimating the likelihood of female CEO 
appointment. However, the number of women on the board of directors alone does not have 
a significant relationship with female CEO appointment. What is more, no relative or 
absolute threshold number for women directors could be determined with the existing data. 
These findings can all be linked to the literature presented in chapter two, which is discussed 
next. 
 
5.1. Absence of critical mass 
 
The first and second hypothesis aimed to understand the relationship between the number of 
female directors and female CEO succession. The first, more specifically, aimed to confirm 
the basic gender spillover theory of Matsa and Miller (2011) and Elsaid and Ursel (2011) 
between boards and CEOs. Surprisingly however, the results for the simple logistic 
regression between number of women on the board of directors and female CEO succession 
yielded statistically insignificant results. The second hypothesis aimed to investigate critical 
mass theory in the context of publicly listed Finnish firms. As discovered by You (2019) 
having the critical mass of three female diretors increases the odds of female CEO succession 
significantly. However, the results were also statistically insignificant. Since both models 
addressed the same issue from different perspectives, it may be beneficial to examine these 
results and their possible causes jointly.  
The small sample size created a major limitation for each regression model. The  total number 
of ‘female CEO’ outcomes was only 15. Looking at model two, which examined the critical 
mass hypothesis, this was particularly challenging. Because each of the four predictor 
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categories contained less than than six events per female succession, none of the categories 
was strong enough to produce significant resutls. Because this could be considered a 
population study, even non-significant  results bring critical insights into the issue in the 
Finnish context. For instance, the lack of boards that contain a critical mass of female 
directors overall is concerning. Figure 8 illustrates that reaching critical mass on boards of 
directors is still uncommon. In fact, only 17% of boards in the sample had three or more 
women. Even more surprising was that 45% of these boards were in male dominated 
industries, 45% in gender equal industries and only 10% in female dominated industries. This 
can be linked back to the findings of Tyrowicz et al (2020), who argue that general female 
representation in the labor market may not be correlated with female participation in 
leadership. The assumption that females would be found in the leadership of traditional 
female driven does not seem to be the case. However, the sample represents only companies 
where new CEOs were appointed and therefore leaves out boards that did not appoint CEOs 
during the time frame. Thus, alternative explanations can be linked to board composition and 
CEO turnover in certain sectors and industries, which requires further research.   
The same trend continues when examining female successions. As many as 10 (66%) of 
female CEO successions occurred in male dominated industries, including 
telecommunications, industrials, technology and basic materials.  Firms in gender equal 
industries, mainly goods and services appointed four female CEOs, whereas only one was 
appointed in the healthcare sector, which is considered a female dominated industry. This 
finding is not in line with You (2019), who discovered that industry female receptiveness, 
which was measured by the gender representation had a significant positive relationship with 
female CEO succession. What is more, Matsa and Miller (2011) explain half of the 
correlations by industry differences, which seems to not be the case in Finland.  
The lack of women CEOs in Finnish stock listed firms is alarming in itself. However, it may 
partially be explained by the even more alarming trend between board size and the number 
of female directors. In fact, as seen in  Figure 8, when the number of female directors 
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increases, so does the size of the board. Therefore, instead of women replacing men on 
boards, it may be the case that women tend to be added in addition of men. Another 
explanation is that women are appointed on larger boards, where their presence is balanced 
by also having more men. Both explanations allude to the idea that women are still not treated 
equally to their male peers in terms of board appointments. Because of this, although the 
absolute number of women may increase, their representation relative to men does not. This, 
in turn, may decrease the degree of influence that female directors possess (Lafuente and 
Vaillant, 2019). According to Lafuente and Vaillant (2019), gender balance, which refers to 
an equal number of women relative to men, is more effective for increasing female influence 
than critical mass. However, gender balance seldom occurs on board of directors. The line 
illustrates where gender balance would be achieved. Data points below the line depict boards 
with a female majority and points above the line show boards with a male majority. Thus, 
the scatterplot shows that the vast majority of boards have a male majority. This indicates 
that female directors remain a clear minority in most firms. This may explain why the number 
of women on boards alone has not been sufficient enough to increase female CEO 
appointments. 
On the other hand, Cook and Glass (2015) present the argument that more important than 
numbers is the relative influence of female directors. This influence was measured by the 
links to other board held by female directors. While the number of female directors is clearly 
not a strong enough predictor for female CEO succession, an alternative explanation for the 
occurred female succession may be in the relative influence theory. The relative influence 
was not the focus of this study, however, it presents an interesting topic for further research 
in the Finnish context.   
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Figure 7 The line of gender equality on boards 
 
Having a majority of women on boards of directors is still extremely rare. In addition, 
achieving gender balance on boards of directors is uncommon. Because of this, detecting its 
impact on female CEO appointment is challenging. However, although the number of 
directors alone was not a strong predictor for female CEO succession, the model that 
combined the number of female directors and executives produced significant results. Thus, 
although the first two hypohteses were not supported, the third brought interesting insights 
into gender spillover effects.  
 
5.2. Gender spillovers 
The third hypothesis incorporated the assumption that gender spillover effects may require a 
wider set of variables. Although the number of directors alone was not a strong predictor for 
female CEO succession, combined with the number of female executives it produced 
statistically significant results. The results for the third model showed that adding one female 
 79 
executive team doubles the odds of female CEO succession. At the same time, the odds of 
female CEO succession increase five times by adding a female director to the board. These 
findings offer strong support to the gender spillover theory. However, it shows that female 
representation needs to be high on both the executive team and board of directors to have a 
strong impact on the likelihood of female CEO appointment. As most previous research has 
emphasized the role of the board of directors in isolation, this finding is not directly in line 
with previous literature. However, You (2019) for example offers some indications of the 
joint effect of increasing directors and executives. 
For instance, You (2019) discovered the importance of female friendliness in addition to 
critical mass on the likelihood of female CEO seleciton. You (2019) measured female 
friendliness by the number of female executives, the gender gap in executive pay, and the 
number of male directors that had links to other boards of firms led by female CEOs. While 
the two latter variables were not included in the analysis due to limited availability of 
information, the first is in line with the results of this study. Following the theoretical 
approach of You (2019), firm female friendliness can explain why female executives have 
such a significant impact in the model. Firms, which appoint females to top executive 
positions are more likely to trust the competence of a woman as CEO. Furthermore, having 
more women on executive teams sends a signal to potential candidates that the firm values 
women, thereby attracting more high potential talent. Therefore, firms with more female 
executives are likely to receive more interest from highly competent female CEO candidates. 
This further increases the chances that a woman is appointed as CEO over a male candidate.  
In addition to female executives signaling that the firm values women leaders, it may also 
offer directors a chance to observe the performance of women in top executive positions. As 
argued by Phelps (1972), discriminatory behavior is amplified by information asymmetry. In 
other words, when directors on the board have little knowledge about the competence and 
performance of female candidates, they are more likely to resort to stereotyping. Thus, when 
directors are able to observe strong performance of female executives first hand, their 
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perception towards female CEOs may shift. Once directors have evidence from within the 
firm that women are equally qualified for executive tasks as males, they may approach CEO 
succession with a more open mind. Thereby, having multiple female non-CEO executives 
can increase the likelihood of female CEO succession by reducing information asymmetry.   
Another possible and likely explanation is that an increased number of female executives 
increases the pool of potential CEO candidates. From an increased group of prospects, the 
likelihood of a woman being selected is higher. For instance, Milkman and McGinn (2012) 
found how having more female executives enhances the career mobility of women at junior 
levels of the company. This helps them reach higher managerial positions, which further 
increases prospects for the top executive positions. In addition, Masta and Miller (2011) 
present the argument that the likelihood of a female CEO is higher in firms where there are 
more potential candidates. Initially, this refers to the number of female directors. For 
example, Gupta and Raman (2019) found that the increasing the number of female directors 
is positively related to female CEO succession only when the CEO is appointed from within 
the board. The authors argue that instead of female directors being more influential in larger 
groups, their increase provides a wider pool of CEO prospects. If this argument is true, a 
similar effect could be assumed to occur in executive teams. Thus, intuitively it can be 
assumed that the high combined effect of female executives and directors on CEO succession 
could be a result of having more competent female CEO candidates.  
 
5.3. Cultural considerations 
 
This study provides significant new insights into gender spillovers in top leadership in 
Finland. Because the findings seem to change from one cultural context to another, the results 
from one country may not be internationally generalizable. However, increasing the 
geographic coverage of research on gender spillovers has multiple benefits. By understanding 
the relationship between corporate boards, executive teams and CEO succession in different 
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countries, cross-comparative studies can be conducted. This can offer valuable insight into 
how gender spillovers are related to the environment in which they occur. Secondly, cross-
cultural understanding of gender equality can offer examples for benchmarking best 
practices. By comparing these findings with those found in the U.S. market, clear differences 
can be found, which require closer examination.  
Considering the possible reasons for why the results particularly for hypothesis one and two 
are different than expected, the cultural context cannot be ignored. Most studies on critical 
mass draw on U.S. based Fortune 500 or Fortune 100 firms as their sample (Konrad et al., 
2008; Kanter, 1977; You, 2019). In these studies, critical mass has been proven essential for 
enabling female inclusion and influence in decision-making. Furthermore, the several studies 
conduced in the U.S. have raised awareness of the inequality present in large 
U.S.corporations. This may, however, not be the case in Finland. In fact, Ylöstalo and Brunila 
(2017) highlight that because Finland is portrayed as a strongly equality-driven society, it 
may be experiencing the opposite effect. Because the majority in Finland believes that gender 
equality already exist, it may be difficult to encourage people for further improvement 
(Ylöstalo & Brunila, 2017). Futhermore, the authors found that because the topic is so 
sensitive, bringing up gender equality issues tend to cause defensive reactions (Brunila & 
Ylöstalo, 2015). Therefore, gender issues are often marginalized and challenged in Finnish 
firms. The approach to gender seems relatively fragmented in the sample firms, meaning that 
there is no one way that firms address gender equality. Therefore, idetifying a clear 
thredshold where female directors gain influene is impossible at this stage. However, this 
fragmentation may be caused by the lack of public discussion about the the areas that still 
need improvement. As long as firms assume that gender equality is already achieved, 
significant improvement is unlikely to occur.  
In addition, Finnish gender equality investigations have highlighted some challenges that 
hinder female career advancement particularly in Finland. Each of these concerns has also 
received attention in the literature.  One specific concern is work-family conflict (Halttula & 
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Saikkonen, 2020). Although Finland has exceptional institutional and financial support for 
parenthood, the burden of work-family conflict still often falls on women. In a culturally 
similar context in Sweden, Keloharju, Knüpfer and Tåg (2016) found that women experience 
more career interruptions due to family matters than men, despite having fewer children. The 
unequal work-family balance may be one of the key obstacles that prevent the increase of 
female CEOs, executives and directors.  
 
Other reports in Finland have highlighted the tendency for women to self-distance and exhibit 
submissive behavior in groups (Horttanainen & Kajala, 2020). As expressed by Oakley 
(2000) the supply of female CEO candidates can also be limited due to the expectation that 
females adapt and blend in rather than voice ideas. Particularly, when group minorities 
consist of only one or two members, they tend to conform to the majority opinions due to 
group pressure dynamics and the fear of discrimination or hyper-scrutiny (Torchia et al, 2011, 
You 2019). Because most boards of directors in Finland (83%) only have two or fewer 
women, this may be a significant concern. Due to the generally low number of female 
directors, submissive behavior is more likely to occur on Finnish boards. However, when the 
women on the executive team are taken into account, the situation changes. This may indicate 
that having more women in the upper echelons in total encourages female directors to take 
more dominant roles in decision making. Even if executives and directors do not directly 
interact, the existence of more women may signal that their opinions are valued (You, 2019). 
Thus, females are more likely to be chosen as CEOs when the overall number of females 
increases in the upper echelons of the firm. 
 
Futhermore, the lack of effort on the part of employers to support the career advancement of 
women is a key reason found for gender inequality specifically in Finland (Horttanainen & 
Kajala, 2020). The lack of support can be seen in recruitment processes which favor male 
candidates, work hour expectations which ignore family commitments and the lack of 
mentoring and support tailored for women (Turunen & Linnainmaa, 2018). Looking at the 
literature, this may indicate that discriminatory behavior exists in some organizations 
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(Phelps, 1972; Wolfers, 2006; Heilman, 2001). On the other hand, the lack of career support 
for women may be due to the perception that women have weaker managerial aspirations 
than men (Hoobler et al., 2011). In this case, firms have more female executives exhibit a 
tendency to support women in reaching top leadership positions. Therefore, those companies 
are likely to be in favor of a female CEO. On the other hand, companies with fewer women 
in the upper echelons in total may offer less support. Thus, Finnish companies should be 
mobilized to place equal effort towards supporting women in their careers.  
In practice, there are several ways in which firms can address this issue. Turunen and 
Linnainmaa (2018) for instance, propose some remedies to encourage gender diversity in 
firms. To begin with, companies should make strategic commitments to increase diversity 
and improve the upward career mobility of women in the organization. This may involve 
restructuring recruitment processes to equally consider and encourage candidates of both 
genders for managerial positions. As seen in the literature, receiving support and challenging 
tasks are linked to the managerial aspirations and performance of women (Hoobler et al., 
2011). Thus, as proposed by Horttanainen and Kajala (2020) personal development and 
mentorship programs can produce valuable outcomes for the career mobility of women. In 
addition, the literature shows that work-family conflict is one of the key challenges for 
women to personally strive for top leadership positions (Gabaldon et al., 2015). Thus, 
empowering women to aspire to executive positions may require flexibility from the firm. 
As proposed by Turunen and Linnainmaa (2018), companies should take into consideration 
the work-life balance even at the highest executive positions by giving up the working around 
the clock mentality. By taking these measures, women are allowed an equal opportunity to 
gain relevant experience and exposure, and a positive example can be set in the organization.  
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5. CONCLUSIONS   
5.1. Main findings  
The purpose of this thesis was to understand how the gender composition of boards of 
directors and executive teams affects the likelihood of female CEO succession. This 
relationship was tested with three hypotheses. Firstly, following the research of Matsa and 
Miller (2011), it was hypothesized that the likelihood of appointing a female CEO increases 
when there are more female directors on the board of directors. The test for hypotheses one 
yielded nonsignificant results. Secondly, based on theoretical contributions of You (2019), 
the second hypothesis assumed that the likelihood of appointing a female CEO increases 
significantly with the critical mass of three or more female directors. This test also yielded 
nonsignificant results. Thus, no definitive conclusions could be made about the relationship 
between women on boards and CEO succession in Finland.  
The third hypothesis combined theoretical contributions of several authors (You, 2019; 
Matsa & Miller, 2019, Milkman & McGinn, 2012). Based on the idea of increasing the pool 
of candidates and reducing information asymmetry about female competence in leadership, 
the third hypothesis was formulated. It proposed that the likelihood of appointing a female 
CEO increases if there are more females in the top executive team and the board of directors. 
The results showed a significant positive effect on the odds of female CEO succession. While 
adding one female executive doubled the odds that a woman was chosen as CEO, increasing 
one director increased the odds five times. This may indicate that for a company to appoint 
a female CEO, the female representation must first rise in both the executive team and the 
board of directors.  
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5.2. Contributions 
This study made several theoretical contributions to the literature. Previous research on the 
relationship between board gender composition and female CEO appointment has offered 
mixed results, and it has mainly concentrated on the largest corporations in the US. Although 
various gender equality investigations have been conducted in Finland, this relationship has 
not previously been examined in the Finnish context. Thus, conducting further research on 
this topic, particularly in the Finnish context, was justified. Furthermore, this study used the 
number of both female executives and female directors as predictors for female CEO 
succession, which had not been done in previous literature. Based on the assumption that 
female directors and executives provide a pool of potential CEO candidates, both entities 
were seen as critical components in CEO succession. Instead of critical mass, the results 
seemed to indicate that spillover effects in the upper echelons require increasing female 
representation at the executive and board level first.  
In addition, the results of this study present some managerial implications. As seen in this 
thesis, female CEO succession does not occur by chance, but requires increasing the number 
of women in the upper echelons systematically. This requires firms to adopt some 
mechanisms found to encourage the career development of women. Such mechanisms can 
include reshaping hiring practices for managerial positions to be gender neutral, offering 
mentorship and self-development programs for women and reducing work-family conflicts 
by offering flexibility in working hours By taking these measures, women are allowed an 
equal opportunity to gain relevant experience and exposure, and a positive example can be 
set in the organization.  
Finland has clearly shown notable improvement in gender equality over the years. As a result, 
it often ranks among the top countries in terms of gender equality. This may lead practitioners 
to think that full equality has already been achieved, which is not the case. By identifying the 
biases and organizational shortcomings that lead to potential discrimination of women in the 
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upper echelons, active behavioral changes can be made. In addition, maintaining active 
public discussion about the areas of gender equality that may still need improvement can 
encourage correct managerial action.  
5.3. Suggestions for further research  
When evaluating the results of this study, several ideas for further research arose. This study 
was conducted at an early stage of CEO gender diversity development in Finland. Therefore, 
the sample size was small, which affected the results and made it challenging to identify 
statistically significant relationships between the variables. Therefore, the first suggestion for 
further research is to conduct a similar study when the population of female CEOs has grown. 
This would allow identification of possible developments in this area and trends that could 
not be detected with such a small sample size.  
Secondly, further research is needed to incorporate the multitude of additional factors that 
may influence CEO succession. A more in-depth study is suggested that includes a wider set 
of control variables particularly on CEO and director characteristics. The CEO appointment 
decision is naturally affected by a wide set of characteristics of the candidate as well as the 
decision makers. These factors may play a central role in selection process. For instance, 
individual level variables like education, nationality, previous work experience, and links to 
and among board members should be accounted for to gain a more comprehensive 
understanding. In addition, the inclusion of employee representatives on the board could be 
controlled for to understand whether they may influence the CEO appointment decision. With 
a more robust set of data, it is possible to identify the effect of gender as opposed to other 
demographic characteristics of the appointed CEO.   
Thirdly, further research is suggested to include that possible effects of company 
restructuring, mergers and acquisitions on the board composition CEO appointment. This 
can increase the accuracy of results and show whether restructuring may change the CEO 
appointment trends. In addition, future research should include the degree of 
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internationalization of the sample companies. This could give more insight into whether 
international influences shape gender equality in firms.  
Finally, further research is suggested to incorporate qualitative methods to understand the 
experiential side of board diversity and female CEO appointment. Exploring the drivers, 
experiences and board dynamics in companies that have appointed female CEOs in Finnish 
stock listed companies is an extremely interesting area for further investigation.
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